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INTRODUCTION

When multinational corporate producers and purveyors of
intellectual products ("IP") demanded changes to the global patchwork
of intellectual property laws, the international community responded.
The resulting Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
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Property Rights ("TRIPS")' represents a dramatic shift away from the
traditional view that intellectual property law primarily serves the
interests of national cultures, values, and politics. 2 Grafted onto the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")' as part of that
regime's conversion into the World Trade Organization ("WTO"),
TRIPS moved radically beyond the highly deferential standard of nondiscriminatory treatment to an actual harmonization of substantive
intellectual property rights ("IPRs").' Although it falls short of creating
truly supranational IPRs, TRIPS expressly requires that each WTO
signatory provide and enforce a specific minimum level of national
patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret IP protection.6
The enthusiasm for "globalizing" intellectual property law suddenly
evaporated, however, when the discussion turned to the related question

1. See Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex IC: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
2. See Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
Property Norms in InternationalTrading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 769,
770-71 (1997); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark Law, 2
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 7-9, 28-30 (1998).
3. See 61 Stat. A-1i, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
4. See WTO Agreement, supra note I; Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 782-83; Paul
Katzenberger and Annette Kur, TRIPS and Intellectual Property, 18 IIC STUDIES 1 (1996).
5. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 8-9 (Anthony D'Amato &
Doris Estelle Long, eds., 1997); Fred H. Cate, IntroductionSovereignty and the Globalization
of Intellectual Property, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1998); Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS:
Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 153, 158-60 (1995). There were a number of prior substantive agreements concerning intellectual property law, notably the Paris and Berne Conventions. See Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris
Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 235 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. TRIPS expanded on the substantive
coverage offered under these agreements and increased the number of adherents to the entire
WTO membership. See Doris Estelle Long, The Protection of Information Technology in a
Culturally Diverse Marketplace, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 129, 149-54
(1996) (noting the expansion of protection under TRIPS); Jerome H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the
WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAWYER 345, 347 (1995) (noting that the TRIPS standards incorporate "basic norms of international intellectual property law" but also go well beyond them
in some instances, such as patent law) [hereinafter Reichman, Minimum Standards]; Jerome
H. Reichman, Enforcing the Enforcement Procedures of the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 335, 338-39 (1997) (noting specifically that national treatment was sufficient for
compliance under the "Great Conventions" (the Paris and Berne Conventions)) [hereafter
Reichman, Enforcing].
6. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 1, 9-39; Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at
784-91; Katzenberger & Kur, supra note 4, at 7. A number of other more specific rights were
also provided. See infra note 49 (providing examples of IPRs addressed in TRIPS).
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of interterritorial exhaustion.7 The negotiations broke down so completely over how the newly mandated national IPRs should work on the
international level that the TRIPS accord contains only a statement
reflecting the parties' failure to agree.8 Ironically, the epic multilateral
agreement on intellectual property law thus left the most fundamental9
"international" IPR issue exclusively under the purview of national law.
Those laws, unsurprisingly, continue to reflect disharmony on the question. O Consequently, not only did everyone leave the TRIPS party
somewhat dissatisfied, but intellectual property law remains a troublesome barrier to international trade."
It seems peculiar that, after the parties overcame the enormous hurdle of substantive IPR harmonization, exhaustion should have proven so
intractable. Analysis of three anomalies in the TRIPS accord, however,
reveals that the disagreement over exhaustion is more than a surprising,
nagging loose end to an international breakthrough accord on IP protection. Rather, it is a manifestation of much more serious instability in the
basic foundations of the parties' agreement that must be understood and
addressed before progress can be made on resolving the exhaustion
question.
First, as the TRIPS IPRs rest primarily (if not exclusively) on economic utility policy justifications, the exhaustion decision should have
turned solely on determining whether maximum efficiency results from
enhanced free-flow of goods in a common global trading market
("common market primacy") or from continued enforcement of the national IPRs ("IPR primacy"). 2 This largely mechanical (albeit factually
complex) calculation and comparison should not have left the negotiations on exhaustion at such a complete standstill. The key lies in
recognizing that the TRIPS utility-based harmonization of "underlying
public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property"' 3 is not, even on its own terms, sufficient to reach a
7. International exhaustion concerns the effect putting an IPR protected product on the
market in one country has on the exercise of parallel IPRs in other countries. See infra notes
30-36 and accompanying text (providing an example of international exhaustion).
8. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6; infra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text.
9. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1,art. 6; Frederick M. Abbott, First Report
(Final)to the Committee on InternationalTrade Law of the InternationalLaw Association on
the Subject of ParallelImportation, 1 J.INT'L ECON. L. 607, 609 (1998) [hereinafter Report];
Ullrich, supra note 5, at 191.
10. See infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments of proponents of each position).
13. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble.
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uniform accord on exhaustion. Maximizing the economic return under
the distinct justifications for the various classes of IPRs (patents, copyright, trademarks, and trade secrets) leads to conflicting outcomes on
exhaustion. More critically, enhancing performance of the global economy in the aggregate says nothing about the distribution of the resulting
wealth. The WTO notwithstanding, international trade still lacks the
common enterprise consensus and corresponding decision-making procedures necessary to resolve these crucial allocation concerns. With each
nation defending its own best interests, who wins and loses under the
different primacy scenarios substantially affects the individual participants' views on the appropriate result."
Second, the fundamental WTO free-trade objective, expressed in
TRIPS as concern that IPRs "do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade,"" incongruously appears to have finished well in second
place. Far from fostering a barrier-free global marketplace, permitting
non-exhaustion means that the TRIPS mandated WTO-wide strengthening of national IPR regimes affirmatively provides IP producers a new
and extremely effective tool for dividing that marketplace along national
boundaries.' 6 This apparent anomaly disappears, however, if TRIPS actually reflects the partially successful use of the GATT/WTO treaty
machinery by developed nations to achieve precisely this outcome. In
short, TRIPS is more accurately viewed as expressly imposing protectionist limitations favoring IP producers on the operation of the
international marketplace. Regardless of whether restricting free-trade to
accomplish other policy objectives is appropriate, 7 it is apparent that
14. Precisely such concerns stymied agreement in TRIPS. See Report, supra note 9, at
619-21. These same problems will come to the fore regarding attempts to add additional policies with distributional consequences to the WTO framework. See Fareed Zakaria, After the
Storm Passes,NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 40; see also sources cited infra note 27.
15. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble.
16. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J.INT'L L. 275, 280
(1997) (noting this competition between free circulation and local protection). See also Hicks
& Holbein, supra note 2, at 770-71; Ullrich, supra note 5, at 191.
17. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 125 (1996) (characterizing these kinds of limitations as an
"intellectual land grab"); Rosemary J. Coombe, Left Out on the Information Highway, 75 OR.

L. R. 237, 245 (1996) (noting the one-dimensional, U.S.-centric effect of "the incorporation of
intellectual property under the purview of international trade"); Jerome H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement after U.S. v. India, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 585, 587
(1998) (noting the potential adverse effects on developing countries) [hereinafter Reichman,
Securing Compliance]. As the November, 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle evidenced, the ap-

propriateness of appending "anti"-free trade issues to the WTO promises to be of substantial
importance and controversy in future rounds, once again pitting the developed nations desires

for "protection" against developing countries advocacy of unfettered free-trade. See sources
cited infra note 27.
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post-TRIPS the GATTIWTO mission cannot be articulated as the uncompromising advocacy of a barrier-free common market.
Finally, particularly as in the absence of an accord on exhaustion,
TRIPS IPRs tip the distributional scales decidedly against the developing countries, it seems mysterious they would have signed on to TRIPS
at all. The logical explanation is that the developed countries' objectives
were accomplished through use of economic power; that TRIPS does not
reflect universal normative accord, but rests instead on coerced
"agreement."'" This understanding reveals that the problems with TRIPS
are more profound than quibbles over IPR exhaustion. In this light, the
failure to agree on exhaustion merely reflects the developing countries'
"last stand" resistance in a losing cause; each country must at least remain free to determine the domestic exhaustion question according to its
best interests.
Far more significantly, the "open-ended" language used to define the
IPRs indicates substantial differences remain over the IPR objectives
themselves." These disagreements include distributional and barrier-free
trade concerns, but go beyond those issues to question whether economic market efficiency and wealth maximization should yield to other
conflicting values, such as guaranteed access to basic needs, natural
rights of IP creators or even the inappropriateness of individual incentives within a communitarian view of the human enterprise. These
differences have already begun to appear in appeals to the WTO dispute
resolution mechanisms. ° In practice, the coerced TRIPS harmonization
may turn out to be more show than substance.
These are important cracks in the TRIPS policy foundations. Only
the naive can believe that the post-TRIPS international intellectual prop-'
erty law agenda consists exclusively of hustling the developing
economies through the accord's transitional phase so global trade can get
on with applying harmonized IPRs in a unified WTO global marketplace. 2'
18. For a discussion of coercion in the TRIPS negotiations, see infra notes 197-213 and
accompanying text.
19. See Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants in InternationalCopyright: Some Problems of Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199 (1994) (describing legal "transplants" and the
related "open-ended" language implications); infra notes 197-213 and accompanying text
(applying Geller's analysis to TRIPS).
20. See infra notes 214, 258-60 and accompanying text.
21. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 65-66 (granting developing economies
certain transitional grace periods); Frederick M. Abbott, The Enduring Enigma of TRIPS: A
Challengefor the World Economic System, I J.INT'L ECON. L.497, 499 (1998) (noting that
the WTO is currently focusing its time and energy on implementation timetables); Jerome H.
Reichman, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private
Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 11, 13-14 (1998) (noting the general expectation that once the deadlines expire all
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Although the economic power of the developed economies may have been
sufficient to force a WTO-wide transplant 2 of economic/utility motivated
TRIPS IPRs, the exhaustion disagreement stands as powerful evidence
that a strong likelihood of rejection remains.
Until these underlying problems are solved, they present an insurmountable barrier to international agreement on exhaustion. The
resolution does not rest in emphatic insistence that "a deal is a deal."
Even when possessed of sufficient power to coerce compliance (hardly a
sure result), an enforcement approach not only incurs costs that adversely affect the very market efficiencies sought to be gained, but offers
no guarantee of a lasting agreement. There is no point in insisting that
TRIPS accomplished more than it did. Its utility-based IPRs and the related market economic efficiency analysis, even when competently
handled,23 merely quantify the respective wealth maximizing benefits of
common market versus IPR primacy.2 That information determines the
outcome on IPR exhaustion only if the parties agree that aggregate economic wealth maximization is the sole relevant criteria. If they do not,
the information (although valuable) does not resolve the profound differences, both distributional and normative, driving disagreement.
Nor is anything to be gained by each party insisting that the overwhelming merits of its position means the only acceptable outcome is
adopting its views on the matter. Short of power implemented coercion
with its attendant difficulties and shortcomings, this is merely a formula
for on-going disagreement. Rather, differences must be expressly acknowledged, discussed, and understood if maximum possible
reconciliation of competing interests is to occur.
This Article proposes a procedural and substantive approach
specifically designed to achieve this result. Concerning process, interim
national and regional decisionmaking and the multilateral debate must
expressly broaden and clarify the values and interests at stake. Three
basic operational principles advance this objective. First, comparisons
based on IPR labels (patent, copyright, and the like) confuse rather than
illuminate. Instead, focus must be on the actual underlying policy
justifications and objectives. Second, the full range of implicated
parties will have "bought into" the "high-protectionist agenda") [hereinafter Reichman, BargainingAround].
22. See Reichman, BargainingAround, supra note 21, at 13-14.
23. For example, Professor Abbott does an excellent job of raising and assessing the arguments. See Report, supra note 9, at 607.
24. Although the economic efficiency model theoretically can be expanded to incorporate all types of interests, these expansions require significant "value" agreements, which
make them impractical in practice. See infra note 272 (discussing the limits on using utility as
the exclusive tool for reconciling various interests).
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justifications (economic and otherwise), including those outside the
decision-makers' own norms, must be expressly identified and
considered. Finally, any position taken or decision reached must
transparently disclose the normative basis for the outcome, specifically
indicating which justifications have been adopted, which have been
rejected, and the reasons why.
Substantive "progress" requires a paradigm shift. We must discard
the assumption that comparing economic returns from common market
and IPR primacy provides the single correct "yes or no" answer on exhaustion. Hoping to build such an agreement on far from compelling
empirical evidence25 assessed within a framework of unresolved value
and interest differences (TRIPS notwithstanding) is a fool's mission.
More importantly, any attempt to force such a "yes or no" outcome in
the face of strongly held conflicting world-views is not merely unachievable, but normatively undesirable.
This Article argues that the "agreement to disagree" embodied in
TRIPS actually represents the appropriate international outcome rather
than the. product of a failed negotiation. It expressly recognizes that international accords (in trade at least) should only be predicated on actual
normative consensus. Rather than an ultimate "yes or no" on exhaustion,
the appropriate objective is a series of context specific outcomes reflecting and reaching only as far as our underlying agreements can take
us. Most critically, those agreements must come from a genuine congruence in values or voluntary compromises reflecting the actual
circumstances of the participants, not because those currently holding
power have determined a prioriwhat is best for everyone based on what
they believe is best for them. Beyond such "true" agreements, the optimal result comes from acknowledging and respecting our differences.
As an important corollary to these proposed process and substantive
changes, it is imperative to revisit the "accords" reached during the
TRIPS negotiations. To foster the open debate required for consensusbuilding, it is necessary to encourage express articulation of all justifications relevant to the interpretation of the rights involved, even if contrary
to the mandated protections in TRIPS. As a consequence, some
"slippage" must be expected, and permitted, in the implementation of
26
TRIPS itself.

25. Cf Report, supra note 9, at 612-13.

26. This is consistent with (if not more generous than) Professor Reichman's numerous
and quite convincing pleas for a more cooperative approach to interpreting and implementing
the TRIPS mandated IPRs. See, e.g., Reichman, BargainingAround, supra note 21, at 11;
Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 17, at 585.
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Finally, strong indications exist that future efforts will be made to
use the WTO machinery to address additional policy considerations,
such as environmental, labor and consumer protection standards, which
also stand in conflict with the unconditional pursuit of barrier-free
trade. 27 As the WTO trading community wrestles with imposing such
limitations, the IPR experience discussed in this Article can provide
valuable guidance.28 In particular, serious consideration should be given
to the likely appropriateness of "agreeing to disagree" in the face of the
unresolved distributional and normative conflicts such debates inevitably
produce.29
This Article discusses the international IPR exhaustion question in
four parts. Part I briefly describes the issue and how it affects the international trading market. This Part first offers a simple explanation and
example of IPR exhaustion. It then discusses the TRIPS debate and concludes with a brief overview of a variety of existing national and
regional laws, drawing attention to the critical role of distributional considerations and the related importance of a sense of "common
enterprise." Part II describes the market-based arguments for and against
international exhaustion. Part III makes the case that addressing exhaustion primarily in economic terms, particularly as a simple contest
between developed and developing countries, overly narrows the debate.
Finally, Part IV details the proposed procedural and substantive changes
necessary to developing an appropriate approach to the international exhaustion question.

I. THE EXHAUSTION ISSUE
A. Basic Exhaustion Mechanics
Despite the difficulties in determining the appropriate answer, articulating the exhaustion issue is straightforward. Intellectual property
law is primarily national, with each country creating and enforcing its
27. At the November, 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle, a variety of constituencies vigorously advocated that these other competing objectives must also be considered. See, e.g.,
Steven Greenhouse, Trade Pacts Must Safeguard Workers, Union Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1999, at AI0; Joseph Kahn & David E. Sanger, Impasse on Trade Delivers A Stinging Blow to Clinton, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 1999, at AI; Robert Wright, World Government is
Coming. Deal with It., NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 17, 2000, at 18.
28. Many of these objectives will not fit comfortably into the basic economic efficiency
"free-trade" WTO paradigm. See supra note 27. Their pursuit will also require attention to
distributional consequences and some sacrifice of "economic wealth" maximizing behavior.
See infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (discussing the need for making these tradeoffs in the context of IPR exhaustion).
29. See infra notes 304-09 and accompanying text.
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own LPRs exclusively within its jurisdiction. ° The creator of an intellectual product must therefore seek protection and enforcement in each
country individually. As a result, the creator may hold a set of parallel
national IPRs covering the same IP in a variety of jurisdictions.
Many nations, particularly those with significant IPR traditions,
follow a rule of national exhaustion."' Under such a rule, authorized distribution (commonly referred to as a "first sale") of a good incorporating
the protected IP will prevent ("exhaust") the holder's further domestic
against those possessing, using or redisenforcement of the related IPRs
2
good.1
particular
the
tributing
International exhaustion concerns the effect of a first sale on the
holder's full collection of parallel national IPRs. Absent international
exhaustion, each IPR is treated as an entirely separate national right.3
National exhaustion has no effect on any other parallel IPR, each of
which continues to be fully enforceable in its jurisdiction. As a result,
the holder can separately invoke each parallel IPR in its jurisdiction
against the import, use, or resale of even authorized products first sold in
another jurisdiction. The effect is that the holder can use the parallel national IPRs to segment the international market, preventing products
sold in one national market from entering other national markets. In
contrast, a rule of international exhaustion treats a first sale in any jurisdiction as automatically "exhausting" the holder's parallel IPRs in all the
other jurisdictions. Under this approach, a product may move freely
sale.4
anywhere in the worldwide market following any first
A simple example demonstrates. Inventor Corporation develops a
new drug for treating Alzheimer's disease that it desires to protect
through patenting. The national nature of patent law requires Inventor
Corporation to select each jurisdiction in which it wishes to obtain
protection, for example, the United States, France, the United Kingdom,
China and Japan. It must then comply with each jurisdiction's specific
requirements for obtaining local patent protection. If successful, Inventor
Corporation will own separate, but parallel, patents covering the drug in
30. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
sources cited supra note 2.

LAW,

supra note 5, 373-88; see also

31. See Report, supra note 9, at 614.
32. National (and international) exhaustion only free the specific good from further
claims by the IPR holder, letting it circulate freely in the marketplace. The holder's IPR, however, remains intact and can be used to prevent direct exploitation of the intellectual product
(the patented invention, the copyrighted work, the trademark) by, for example, making addi-

tional products or copies. See

DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW

984-

85 (1998) (noting Judge Rich's point that exhaustion is misleading in this important respect).

33. See Ullrich, supra note 5, at 159-60.
34. When making a first sale, therefore, the holder must incorporate exhaustion into her

computation of the sales price.
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each country. Each patent will provide the rights established and
enforceable under local law. Those rights generally include the exclusive
right to make and sell the drug in, and import the drug into, the
particular country for a fixed period of time.35
Because of different market and regulatory conditions, Inventor
Corporation's sales price for the drug may differ among countries. For
example, the market price in the United Kingdom may be substantially
lower than in Japan.36 An independent trading company notices the price
disparity. The trading company buys large quantities of the drug sold by
Inventor Corporation in the United Kingdom. The trading company then
imports the drug into the Japan for resale at less than Inventor Corporation's local market price.
Inventor Corporation seeks to stop the trading company's sales in
Japan. It does so by asserting that the trading company's importation and
sales of the drug .in Japan infringe its Japanese patent. Under a strictly
national view of patent rights, each patent is an entirely independent
right and Inventor Corporation will prevail. Under national exhaustion,
Inventor Corporation's first sale to the trading company in the United
Kingdom would exhaust Inventor Corporation's ability to control further
use or distribution of the product in the U.K. through enforcement of its
U.K. patent. However, the United Kingdom activities have no extraterritorial effect in Japan on the Japanese patent. The Japanese patent
rights therefore remain in full force and can be raised to block the trading company's importation or resale of the product in Japan.
In contrast, under a rule of international exhaustion the parallel U.K.
and Japanese national patent rights would not be treated as fully independent. Inventor Corporation's sale of the product to the trading
company in the U.K. would exhaust not only the local U.K. patent rights
but also the rights under all parallel patents in every other jurisdiction,
including in Japan. Consequently, the trading company would be free to
import and resell the drug products rightfully purchased in the U.K. in
all other countries worldwide.
B. InternationalExhaustion under TRIPS
The TRIPS Preamble starts with the following statement of objectives: "Members, [d]esiring to reduce distortions and impediments to
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective
35. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1,art. 28.

36. The U.K. sets maximum drug prices by law to protect consumers. See, e.g., Case
16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, [1974] E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974)

(discussing the U.K. regulations in an intra-E.U. "free movement" of goods case); Report,
supra note 9, at 623 (discussing the effects of such price controls on exhaustion).
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and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not
This language indicates that
themselves become barriers to trade ...
the TRIPS accord sought to address intellectual property issues from
three perspectives: a desire to promote undistorted and unimpeded free
trade in intellectual products, a desire to protect "ownership" interests in
intellectual products, and a desire to avoid having such protection become a barrier to trade in related goods and services. However, in
contrast to the lofty Preamble language, the substantive provisions of
TRIPS reflect a distinct preference for ownership protection over free
trade in related goods and services. Understanding this disconnect from
basic WTO free-trade objectives requires a brief examination of the preTRIPS multilateral environment and what TRIPS did and did not
change.
Intellectual property protection traditionally has been viewed as
properly within the province of national law, reflecting primarily, if not
exclusively, local values, interests and objectives.38 With some notable
exceptions, most international agreements therefore addressed intellectual property issues largely in terms of non-discrimination rather than
substantive rights harmonization.39 Generally, this meant each nation's
rules and rights could be independently and idiosyncratically developed
provided they applied on equal terms to nationals and non-nationals
("national treatment").
The result was considerable variation among national IPRs,
reflecting differences in local views and circumstances. Of particular
consequence to international trade in IP, disparities in domestic
economic conditions generally resulted in different levels of protection
afforded by developed and developing countries.' The laws of
developed countries (paradigmatically the United States), as net
producers of intellectual products, tended to favor IP creators. They
generally created a broad variety of highly protective regimes, including
patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret laws, coupled with robust

37. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, Preamble.
38. See Report, supra note 9, at 607.
39. See Long, supra note 5, at 149-50; Reichman, Minimum Standards, supra note 5, at
347-48.
40. See Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPS Agreement and Global Economic Development, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 385, 387 (1996); Jerome H. Reichman, From Free Riders to
FairFollowers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 11, 12 (1997); Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 17, at 585-86. It is argued

below in this Article that these variations reflect more than differences in economic development involving fundamental differences in cultural values as well. See infra notes 214-58 and
accompanying text.
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enforcement. In contrast, countries with emerging or non-participating
economies, as net consumers of intellectual products, tended to favor
freer access to IP as a vehicle for continued economic growth. Their
regimes offered much narrower protection, if any, and substantially
more limited enforcement.
These differences had a variety of effects on the international market
in IP and IP-related goods and services. Some nations providing little or
no protection became locations of choice for producers who wished to
capitalize on the ability to use intellectual products without paying compensation. ' This resulted in lower-cost local and export competition to
IP creators. Creators were, naturally, reluctant to expose intellectual
products to "low protection" markets for fear of facilitating such competition. It was argued this reluctance distorted international trade by
inhibiting the free-flow of IP throughout the worldwide market.4 '2 Additionally, low protection jurisdictions reduced or eliminated the
incentives provided by IPRs to the creation of IP, arguably resulting in
an under-supply of goods and services tailored to local needs.43
As international trade burgeoned, these concerns became increasingly important to IP holders in developed economies." Not only did
they feel that lack of adequate protection impaired access to a number of
commercially desirable markets, but that the outflow of goods produced
in low protection jurisdictions had a significant negative effect on their
return from other markets as well. In response to industry pressure,
particularly in the United States, the developed nations 5 put the issue of
increased intellectual property protection on the agenda at the end of the

41. See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, Public Policy and Global Technology Integration:An
Introduction, 72 CHI-KENT L. REv. 345, 345-46 (1996); Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and InternationalIntellectual Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 465, 469-71 (1994); Reichman, Minimum Standards, supra note 5, at 346

(noting the increasing importance of IP and the ease of free-riding); Report, supra note 9, at
616, 619-20; Ullrich, supra note 5, at 184-85. Although these low cost producers are referred

to as "pirates" and "counterfeiters," that label begs the question of whether intellectual property protection and compensation to the creator is the appropriate policy approach.
42. See Report, supra note 9, at 622; Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflicts Between Parallel
Tradeand ProductAccess and Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals,1 J.

INT'L ECON.

L.

637, 648 (1998) (making the argument ex post in support of the TRIPS change).
43. See Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision
in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 530 (1996)
(making the argument ex post in support of the TRIPS change).
44. See Abbott, supra note 40, at 388-89 (noting the pressures); Doane, supra note 41, at

465-66 (noting the increased concern within the United States), 469-70.
45. See Doane, supra note 41, at 466; Long, supra note 5, at 134-35 (noting the increased value of IP exports, leading the "have" nations to want more return from the "havenot" nations); Report, supra note 9, at 607.
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Tokyo Round of GA'T negotiations.4 That discussion involved only
counterfeiting of trademarked goods. No agreement was reached.
Driven by continued industry and developed nation pressure, the
topic returned in full flower during the Uruguay Round. The result, after
much debate, stalemate, and difficulty, was the TRIPS accords. 7 Although TRIPS incorporated the traditional international requirement of
national treatment,48 the agreement went two important steps further in
addressing the international IP trading industry's concerns. First, substantive IPRs were themselves harmonized, mandating each WTO
member's national laws provide certain minimum substantive patent,
copyright, trademark, and trade secret rights 9 Second, members agreed
to offer "fair and equitable" enforcement of those substantive rights by
providing "effective action against any act of infringement.., including
expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements."'
The minimum national requirements approach to encouraging freer
international flow and development of IP carries a substantial risk of
creating or raising other barriers to trade. TRIPS does not create single,
unified "international" IPRs.5 The IP "owner" still obtains a collection
of locally enforceable IPRs, one from each jurisdiction. Standing alone,
requiring stronger independent national IPRs in every WTO member
country therefore enhances both the holder's portfolio of parallel national rights and the related ability to use them to restrict the free flow of
IP-related goods in the worldwide market." Without further action, the
TRIPS national "harmonization" reduces barriers to flow of IP in exchange for increased barriers to flow of IP-related goods.

46. See Alexander A. Caviedes, InternationalCopyright Law: Should the European Union DictateIts Development?, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 165, 187-90 (1998); Doane, supra note 41,
at 471-72.
47. Doane, supra note 41, at 472-73. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting
First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689 (1989) (discussing the negotiation
history).
48. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 3.
49. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 9-40. More specialized rights include performers' rights (art. 14), geographical indications (arts. 22-24), industrial designs (arts. 2526) and maskworks (arts. 35-38). See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 784-91; Katzenberger & Kur, supra note 4, at 7.
50. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 41. See Reichman, Enforcing, supra note 5, at
338-39 (noting how this upped the ante for developing nations).
51. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
52. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (describing the market segmentation
possibilities without a rule favoring international exhaustion).
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The TRIPS negotiators recognized that mandating "first sale"
international exhaustion eliminated this trade-off. 3 The issue was hotly
debated. 5' Exhaustion proponents argued that the resulting flow of
parallel imports would have the salutatory effect of forcing precisely
those market competition efficiencies envisioned by the free-trade
principles driving GATT and its WTO successor.5 Non-exhaustion
advocates argued that permitting market divisions could have positive
effects on the creation and availability of intellectual products 6 and
avoids unnecessary intrusion on the strong tradition of national
sovereignty over intellectual property matters.
Eventually the exhaustion discussion exhausted the negotiators. Article 6 of TRIPS reflects their ultimate inability to agree: "For purposes
of dispute settlement under this Agreement ...nothing in this Agree-

ment shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights."" As a result, national and regional authorities retain
exclusive decision-making authority over the issue.59 Moreover, Article 6
expressly instructs those authorities not to interpret TRIPS as providing
any guidance on the question.
Consequently, TRIPS only partly accomplished the goals articulated
in its Preamble. It was "successful" in creating stronger national IPRs
throughout the WTO and thereby encouraging freer flow of IP in the
worldwide marketplace. 60 However, it not only failed to avoid the trade
barriers arising from such rights, but actually provided the means for
increasing them.6'
53. Technically, there are two forms of exhaustion. The first is the expiration of a fixed
term of protection for the right itself. The substantive harmonization process addressed the
term issue by setting minimal terms of protection. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts.
12, 18, 33. The second, more complex issue involves exhaustion through exploitation, the

effect of a holder authorized "first sale."
54. See Report, supra note 9, at 609.
55. See id. at 622; infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing the arguments
in detail).
56. See Report, supra note 9, at 622; infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text

(discussing the arguments in detail).
57. Under international exhaustion, previously purely domestic operation of IPRs be-

come interrelated with extraterritorial actions (a first sale) in one nation affecting application
of the intellectual property laws in another. See supra note 5 (noting the tradition of territoriality in intellectual property law). Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property
Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 584-85 (1997) (noting the traditional
territorial principal and arguing against unilateral, extraterritorial application of substantive

laws).
58. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 6.

59. See Report, supra note 9, at 609; Ullrich, supra note 5, at 191.
60. But see Abbott, supra note 40, at 390-92 (highlighting empirical evidence which

suggests that foreign investment does not necessarily follow strong IP protection).
61. See Ullrich, supra note 5, at 191.
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C. The "Status Quo"-Assessing the CurrentNational
and Regional Positions on Exhaustion
61

The TRIPS accord did not create the IPR exhaustion question.
Many countries, particularly those with strong intellectual property traditions, have faced the issue with respect to the effects of domestic IPRs
on their internal market and regarding imports from outside that market.63 Additionally, the rise of regional trading blocks, including the
European Union ("E.U."),6 the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA") 65 and MERCOSUR, 66 has forced members of those communities to address the issue as part of creating their new "common
markets." These national and regional experiences provide useful information for future discussions concerning the appropriate international
approach.
The fundamental consideration in IPR exhaustion is whether to favor
free flow of goods (common market primacy) 67 or continued IPR
enforcement (IPR primacy)i6 The existing national and regional
positions on the international question fall into both camps, consistent
with the TRIPS disagreement on exhaustion. 69 The most frequently
drawn generalization is that developed economies favor international
non-exhaustion (IPR primacy) while developing economies favor
exhaustion (common market primacy). 70 There are, however, troubling
inconsistencies in the operation of this "rule," most particularly on the
developed economy side. Although non-exhaustion proponents have

62. See Report, supra note 9, at 610.
63. See, e.g., Darren E. Donnelly, ParallelTrade and InternationalHarmonizationof the

Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, 13

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER

& HIGH TECH. L.J. 445, 449-85

(1997) (discussing the domestic positions on international exhaustion in the United States, the
European Union and Japan).
64. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 247, as amended by the
Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997 [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty].
65. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFrA Agreement].
66. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, Arg.-Braz.-Parag.-Uru.,
30 I.L.M. 1041 (1991) [hereinafter MERCOSUR].
67. Common market primacy is certainly an express goal of the WTO, if not its only
goal. See Report, supra note 9, at 611. Cf Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 800 (noting that
the objective of a common market is free circulation of goods).
68. See Donnelly, supra note 63, at 447; Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 770-71; Report, supra note 9, at 607; Karl Ruping, Copyright and an Integrated European Market:
Conflicts with Free Movement of Goods, Competition Law and National Discrimination, 11
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 5-12 (1997) (discussing these trade-offs in the European Union
context).
69. See Donnelly, supra note 63, at 448; Report, supra note 9, at 610.
70. See Report, supra note 9, at 609, 613; Ullrich, supra note 5, at 192.
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included France, Italy7' and the United States, as expected, a number of
nations with highly developed economies, such as Japan,72 Germany,73
Sweden,74 Holland," Norway, and Finland,7" have favored exhaustion.
The E.U., with its powerful internal economy, consistently favors
"international" exhaustion among its Member States" (although it does
not apply this rule when non-Members are involved).78
The explanation lies in understanding that a nation's international
IPR exhaustion decision does not turn exclusively on determining
whether common market or IPR primacy maximizes aggregate performance of the global economy. Whenever the calculation includes parties
not viewed as involved in a common economic enterprise with the decision-maker, how the resulting benefits are allocated under the adopted
rule profoundly influences the outcome. Nations (and regions) are not
coming out differently on the same global calculation; they are performing independent, self-interested valuations. The determinative factor
on international exhaustion therefore is more precisely stated as "which
primacy rule provides the maximum benefit to the decision-maker or, at
most, those in common enterprise with the decision-maker." 79
The European Union provides the paradigmatic example. When
forming the European Economic Community, now a pillar of the E.U.,, °
the signatories to the Treaty of Rome (the "EEC Treaty") 8' recognized
71. See Carl Baudenbacher, Trademark Law and Parallel Imports in a Globalized
World-Recent Developments in Europe with Special Regard to the Legal Situation in the

United States, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 645,663 (1999).
72. See John A. Tessensohn & Shusaku Yamamoto, The BBS Supreme Court Case-A
Cloth Too Short for an Obi and Too Long for a Tasuki, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
721, 725-39 (1997) (criticizing the pro-exhaustion position of the Japanese Supreme Court in
BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik AG v. K. K. Racimex, 51 MINSHA 2299 (Sup. Ct., July 1, 1997)).
73. See Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 664-65; Report, supra note 9, at 610 (both noting that the decision in the Dyed Jeans case eliminated the rule of international exhaustion of
trademarks in light of what the German Federal Supreme Court viewed as the contrary E.U.
position in the E.U. Trademarks Directive).
74. See Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 662.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 663-65; Jean-Francois Verstrynge, Copyright in the European Economic

Community, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 5, 17 (1993) (both noting the
subsequent elimination of the inconsistent positions upon joining the E.U.).
77. See Report, supra note 9, at 609.
78. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
79. Cf Wendy S. Vicente, Comment: A Questionable Victory for Coerced Argentine
Pharmaceutical Patent Legislation, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1101, 1119-20 (1998)
(noting the similar national calculation with regard to implementation of a more protective
IPR regime).
80. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the EEC was absorbed and continued as one of the
three pillars of the E.U. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 64, art. G(A)(I).
81. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J.
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the economic benefits of pursuing the formation of a single, barrier-free
"common market. 82 By joining the E.U., each Member State expresses
its belief that, although all boats may not rise equally, it individually
stands to gain more from this joint econormiic enterprise than by going it
alone in the world marketplace. 83 This consensus on common market
primacy is expressly set out in the EEC Treaty." Consequently, although
the EEC Treaty also expressly provides that national Member State IPRs
are to be respected,"' individual national IPR policies are subordinate to
the pursuit of the shared benefits derived from forging an open trading
market. The European Court of Justice ("E.C.J."), therefore, has consistently invoked an intra-E.U. "first sale" exhaustion rule. This rule
prohibits any post-intra-E.U. first sale exercise of IPRs granted by
Member States that impedes the free-flow of goods within the common
market.&
In contrast, in a recent decision involving trademarked goods first
sold outside the E.U. and then imported into its common market, the
E.C.J. came out against exhaustion. 7 Although the decision was based
primarily on the specific language of the E.U. Trademark Directive,88 the
different outcome demonstrates the crucial role of benefits allocation on

(L 169) 1 (1987). The Maastricht Treaty substantially amended the EEC Treaty to reflect the
additional goals of the European Union. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 64, art. A; GEORGE
A.

BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW

2-4 (Supp.

1995).
82. See EEC Treaty, supra note 81, art. 3. The Maastricht Treaty amended Article 2 of
the EEC Treaty to incorporate the additional pillars of the European Union. See Maastricht
Treaty, supra note 64, art. G(B)(2).
83. Additionally, the members must believe that any significant disparities in allocation
of the net gains among them will be satisfactorily dealt with by E.U. redistribution mechanisms, such as taxes and subsidies. The issue was a significant bargaining point in the
formation of the E.U. See infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
distributional concerns in the absence of common enterprise).
84. See EEC Treaty, supra note 81, art. 2.
85. See id. at art. 36; Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 E.C.R.
2853, 2872-73, [1983] 2 C.M.L.R. 47, 60--61 (1982).
86. See, e.g., Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellscheft GmbH v. Metro-SBGrossmdrkte GmbH, 1971 E.C.R. 487, [1971] C.M.L.R. 631 (1971); Abbott, supra note 40, at
397; Donnelly, supra note 63, at 470-83; Ruping, supra note 68, at 5-11.
87. See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Internat'l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft Gmbh, 1998 E.C.R. 1-4799, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. 953 (1998). For a detailed discussion of this case, see Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 645; William J. Littman,
Recent Developments, The Case of the Reappearing Spectacles, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
479 (1999). See also Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R.
329, [1982] C.M.L.R. 677 (1982).
88. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1. See Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at
656-58 (discussing the E.C.J. ruling in Silhouette).
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exhaustion decisions." Inside the E.U., in order for the common enterprise to maximize the shared benefits of an efficiently operating single
barrier-free market, goods must be permitted to move without interference from exercise of parallel Member State IPRs. 9° When goods are
brought in from the outside (or sent out), however, the "easy" common
enterprise solution to the benefits allocation question disappears. Who
specifically stands to gain and lose from IPR barriers to trade must be
carefully considered."
These same allocation considerations also cause variations in national positions on internal (national) and external (international)
exhaustion, as the U.S. positions demonstrate. Despite its strong IPR
traditions, the United States follows an internal rule of "first sale" exhaustion in patent, copyright and trademark law. 92 This outcome reflects
a determination that free trade, common market primacy maximizes aggregate wealth creation within the United States market despite the
limits it places on returns to intellectual property creators. In contrast,
the United States has consistently favored an IPR primacy driven non-

89. The Advocate General's arguments about uneven benefits within the E.U. from divergent Member State views and the need to obtain international reciprocity are particularly
clear on the matter. See Silhouette International, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-4815, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at
963-64; Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 655, 692-95 (noting that the E.C.J. "acted as executor of the intentions of the vast majority of Member States . . . and the European
Commission" and that the reciprocity argument focuses on the importance of obtaining benefits for the individual decision-maker).
90. See Silhouette International, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-4831, [1998] 2 C.M.L.R. at 963--64.
91. See Bale, supra note 42, at 647 (noting the E.U. "is redefining internal E.U. trade as
domestic trade" in effect changing the territorial reach of the common enterprise from national
to regional); Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 695 (noting the differing views of the Member
States on the benefits question); Littman, supra note 87, at 495, 501 (noting that the E.C.J.
merely deferred to the E.U. legislative and executive branches to make the final determination
for the E.U. as a whole on the question of international exhaustion); Report, supra note 9, at
617 (pointing out that internal policies directed toward creating a common market "do not
necessarily extend to relations with third countries").
92. For "first sale" exhaustion in patent law, see United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316
U.S. 241 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys.
Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994). For
first sale exhaustion in copyrights, see Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908)
(subsequently codified in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994)). The first sale doctrine is more commonly referred to simply as "exhaustion" in trademark law. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264
U.S. 359 (1924); Champion Spark Plug v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947); NEC Electric v. Cal
Circuit ABCO, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987). See also Bale, supra note 42, at 639;
Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied Li-

cense in IntellectualProperty Law, 58 MD. L. R. 423, 429-36 (containing a good summary of
the first sale doctrine under U.S. law). A number of other countries also apply a rule of
"national" (domestic market) exhaustion. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 63, at 483 (citing
WARWICK ROTHNIE, PARALLEL IMPORTS (1993) and noting that a number of European countries take this approach).
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exhaustion position in the international marketplace. 9 Clearly, considerations beyond barrier-free maximization of wealth creation, including,
most particularly, the supplemental wealth transfers to U.S. IP creators
from international market segmentation, have placed a self-interested
thumb on the scale in favor of continued IPR enforcement.94
The example of the United States provides the basic explanation for
the general division on international exhaustion between developed and
developing nations. 95 Developed economies (including regional common
enterprises such as the E.U.), as net creators of intellectual products,
stand to gain from the continued flow of benefits to their IP creators
from external markets under IPR primacy. They therefore will generally
come out against international exhaustion. Developing economies, as net
IP consumers, seek to eliminate these IPR wealth transfers to foreign

93. See, e.g., Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890) (no international exhaustion of parallel national patents). This caution was also visible in the U.S. position against international
exhaustion in the TRIPS negotiations and afterwards. See Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at
677 (noting the United States' reaction to legislation from New Zealand and Australia favoring international exhaustion); Report, supra note 9, at 609. The recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L'Anza Research International,Inc., 523
U.S. 135 (1998), is not to the contrary. Quality King involved goods made and sold in the
United States, exported, and then brought back into the United States. See id. at 154
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). Therefore, it does not involve exhaustion of parallel national
rights, only U.S. rights. See id. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Baudenbacher, supra note
71, at 676-77 (noting the narrowness of the Quality King decision). The situation in trademark law is more complex. Although in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), the
United States Supreme Court appeared to take a non-exhaustion stance, that holding has been
narrowly read to apply only when the parallel trademarks are not subject to common ownership or control. See K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988); see also
Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 677-87 (discussing the "material differences" exception to
exhaustion even when there is common ownership or control); Donnelly, supra note 63, at
454-58.
94. Cf. Report, supra note 9, at 624 (noting the wealth transfer problem). It is interesting
to observe that one group of commentators excoriated the Japanese Supreme Court for its
generosity in adopting a rule of international exhaustion based in part on the harm to Japanese
holders of significant parallel LPR portfolios. See Tessensohn and Yamamoto, supra note 72,
at 733-34. The authors find the decision "an undesirable departure among the mainstream
industrial jurisdictions." Id. at 740-41. They specifically note the difference in E.U. law
drawn between intra-E.U. "common market" trade and parallel imports from outside the E.U.
See id. at 739-41.
95. IPR issues have been cast as a contest between developed nations and developing
(and non-participating) nations, most recently regarding the effects of the mandated adoption
of national IPRs under TRIPS. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism,Anticommons Property,
and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of InternationalIntellectual Property
Protection,6 IND. J.GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 57 (1998); Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of
Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: An Intellectual PropertyPerspective, 23 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229, 235-40 (1998) [hereinafter Long, Culture]; A. Samuel Oddi,
TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415,455 (1996).
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holders and, consequently, will generally favor international exhaustion. 96
This logic, however, fails to explain why a substantial number of
developed countries nonetheless favor international exhaustion. 97 Closer
analysis reveals that although the net IP creator or consumer formulation
plays an important role, it fails to fully reflect the maximum benefit to
the decision-maker calculation. Specifically, it overlooks an important
additional variable: the potential positive domestic effects of free-trade
price competition under international exhaustion. The combined effects
of whether a nation is a net IP creator or consumer and the free-trade
effects on local market conditions actually drive the final decision.9"
This more complete calculus explains why a developed, net IP
producing nation (or region) may still come out in favor of international
exhaustion. As noted, a developed economy will generate numerous
domestic holders of large parallel IPR portfolios and non-exhaustion
based international market segmentation will therefore likely generate
net in-bound flows of wealth. The question remains, however, whether
these benefits are offset by the costs of lost parallel import competition
in the domestic market. The answer lies primarily in the relationship
between domestic and foreign prices for IP-related goods. When
domestic prices are generally lower than elsewhere in the world,
international non-exhaustion primarily protects income transfers to
national IPR holders in "foreign" premium markets by protecting them
against exports from the lower cost domestic market. 99 The "isolation" of
96. Any United States denizen doubting the power of this view need look no further than
that nation's own history of offering weak IP protection regime when a developing, IPconsuming nation and becoming an aggressive protector of creators' rights when it became a
net IP producer. See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK ISAN ELEGANT OFFENSE
4-5 (1995) [hereinafter ALFORD, ELEGANT OFFENSE]; William P. Alford, Making the World
Safe for What? Intellectual PropertyRights, Human Rights and Foreign Economic Policy in
the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135, 146-47 (1996)
[hereinafter Alford, Making Safe]. There are contrary arguments that, despite the wealth transfer, benefits from greater access, investment and growth make stronger IP protection in the
developing countries' best interests. See, e.g., Adelman & Baldia, supra note 43; Bale, supra
note 42, at 647-65; Edmund W. Kitch, The PatentPolicy of Developing Countries, 13 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 166 (1994); EARL L. GRINOLS & HWAN C. LIN, ASYMMETRIC INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION AND NORTH-SOUTH WELFARE,

Business Research Working Paper No. 98-0106 (March 1998).

Bureau of Economics &

97. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.

98. Even this more complex national market view may become outdated by the

"globalization" of markets. Cf THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 722 (1999). The distributional concern in that environment moves from national boundaries to
individual/corporate "IP haves" versus individual/corporate "IP have-nots."
99. The United States tends to be a "lower cost" market with regard to IF-related goods.
Occasionally, a particular domestic multinational's worldwide pricing will expose the manufacturer to cheaper foreign parallel imports. This is more likely to occur with less "high-tech"
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the domestic market therefore has little effect on national consumers.
Consequently, these developed economies can favor domestic IP
creators through non-exhaustion without incurring substantial consumer
cost or risk of related political backlash.
In contrast, in developed economies whose national markets generally have higher prices for IP-related goods, such as Japan, Germany,
Finland, and Norway, domestic consumers will benefit from the pricecompetition provided by parallel imports from lower cost "foreign" jurisdictions.'m There may, therefore, be substantial cost to domestic
consumers, and related resistance, to IPR-based protection of the local
premium market. Clearly, there is no domestic benefit to facilitating
isolation of the national market by foreign parallel IPR holders who export extra wealth obtained from domestic purchasers. However, these
national decision-makers must calculate whether the international market-segmentation returns to domestic IPR holders exceed the cost to its
consumers. 1 Whenever this comparison favors domestic purchasers, as
will frequently be the case, the developed nation should favor international exhaustion despite the lost wealth transfers to its IP creators., 2
The above analysis highlights three critical aspects of exhaustion
decision-making. First, primacy distributional considerations play a
pivotal role, with the decision-maker focusing not merely on aggregate
efficient market performance, but on specific allocation of benefits.
Second, sharing benefits through common economic enterprise shifts the

goods. For example, in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research International,Inc.,
523 U.S. 135 (1998), the IPR involved was copyright protection for the label; in K Mart Corp.
v. Cartier,Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988), the trademark on the goods was at issue, rather than IP
incorporated in the goods themselves. See discussion supra note 93.
100. See Tessensohn & Yamamoto, supra note 72, at 733, 746-47 (noting the potential
consumer benefits in Japan's regulated economy and the related harm to Japanese national
parallel IPR holders).
101. This same calculus applies generally to developing countries, but without the same
level of concern for the much fewer domestic IPR holders. However, if a developing country
finds itself to be a "low price" market, it may need to advocate a rule of international nonexhaustion to encourage entry by foreign IPR holders.
102. Much of the wealth transfer may actually be from domestic customers who cannot
gain access to even domestic IPR holder's cheaper, foreign-produced goods. Ironically, as the
stronger IPRs mandated under TRIPS begin to take hold, the United States and other "lowpriced" developed nations will have to deal with their effect on the creation and flow of IP
and IP-related goods. Specifically, increased IPR protection encourages both more "foreign"
creation of IP and "off-shore" manufacturing by domestic interests in lower-cost foreign jurisdictions. Therefore, in addition to the "job-flight" difficulties, as foreign production of IPrelated goods increases, so will the "protection" of the higher-cost domestic market from an
influx of cheaper off-shore goods, forcing these previously enthusiastic non-exhaustion national policy-makers to deal with the resulting tension between consumer and IPR holder
interests.
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distributional "boundary."'' 3 Those within the common enterprise are
likely to make a joint decision on international exhaustion based on the
benefits to the enterprise as a whole."°' Third, and far from incidentally,
common enterprise (national and regional) "internal" decisions generally
call for first sale exhaustion, thus indicating their belief that aggregate
wealth maximization most likely flows from common market rather than
IPR primacy. 5 Consequently, consideration of distributional effects in
international exhaustion decisions likely has adverse affects on overall
market performance.
D. An Aside Concerning InternationalTrading Agreements
under the Common EnterpriseModel.
Before addressing the implications of this analysis for TRIPS, it is
worth briefly noting what it reveals about two other significant regional
free-trade agreements. The NAFTA free-trade agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States expressly addressed harmonization
and the strengthening of national intellectual property rights.3 , During
the negotiations, Mexico recognized the related potential for market
segmentation adversely affected Mexican interests and argued fervently
in favor of including a mandated provision on intra-region exhaustion of
those rights.0 7 That battle was lost in the face of U.S. opposition, and the
agreement leaves international exhaustion as a question for national
law.t°8 Quite clearly, the United States does not view the creation of a
common market within the NAFTA territory in the same shared
103. See, e.g., Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 651 (noting the EFTA Court's argument
that individual states should retain their autonomy on foreign trade in the EEA and contrasting
this view with the E.C.J.'s position on how international exhaustion should be treated within
the E.U.).
104. Distribution of the resulting benefits is handled internally by the rules of the common enterprise. See supra notes 80-91 (discussing the E.U. rules).
105. This outcome apparently assumes that IPR objectives can be achieved by permitting the holder to control only the first sale of goods or services based on the protected IP.
This is consistent with incentive based IPRs, but needs refinement to accommodate other
policies. See infra notes 148-72 and accompanying text (discussing the different outcomes
under the different U.S. regimes); infra notes 214-57 and accompanying text (discussing
further issues raised by other policy foundations, such as moral rights).
106. See NAFTA Agreement, supra note 65, arts. 1701-03; Hicks & Holbein, supra
note 2, at 791-800.
107. See Answer of Mr. Hertz, Proceedingsof the Canada-UnitedStates Law Institute
Conference NAFTA Revisited, Discussion After the Speeches of Joseph Papovich and Allen
Hertz, 23 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 327, 329 (1997) (noting that the Mexican position favored eliminating all barriers arising from IPRs, the United States favored permitting IPR holders to
segment the market, and Canada held out for the right to "judge sector by sector"); Sean
McMillan, Comments on the Current Status of Intellectual andIndustrialProperty Regulation
in Mexico, 1 U.S.-MEX. L. J. 57, 58-59 (1993).
108. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 811.
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"common enterprise" terms as the Member States of the E.U. The United
States' commitment does not reach to extending the distributional
boundary beyond its borders and sacrificing the market segmentation
wealth transfers to its far more numerous IPR holders. '°9
The MERCOSUR agreement, creating the Common Market of the
Southern Cone between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay,110
only addresses harmonization of trademark and geographical indications
protections. "' Although expressly permitting international exhaustion,
the MERCOSUR agreements leave the actual decision to the member
states."' This outcome reflects an understanding that, although international exhaustion is a prerequisite to a maximally performing, shared
enterprise common market, at the present stage of MERCOSUR's development, individual members should
be left to act in accordance with
13
interests.'
distributional
best
own
their

II. THE

ECONOMIC ARGUMENT FOR

COMMON MARKET PRIMACY

The analytical framework similarly indicates that by leaving the exhaustion question to individual member interests, the TRIPS negotiators
demonstrated a less than firm commitment to the GATT/WTO objective
of creating a barrier-free WTO common market." ' Continued growth in
109. It is yet to be seen how consumers might react to the protection of a premium
United States market. See supra note 102.
110. See MERCOSUR, supra note 56.
111. Protection is provided under the Protocol of Harmonization of Intellectual Property
Norms in the MERCOSUR with respect to Trademarks and Geographical Indications, signed
on August 5, 1995. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 800-10; Vicente, supra note 79, at
1111-12 (noting the lack of intellectual property standardization).
112. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 811.
113. As Latin American views on intellectual property laws evolve considerable changes
are occurring, including a convergence on the TRIPS mandated standards and initial national
positions in favor of international exhaustion. See Carlos Correa, Harmonizationof Intellectual Property Rights in Latin America: Is There Still Room for Differentiation?, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 109, 120 (1997) (noting the Argentine and Andean Group regulations);
Hicks & Holbein, supra note 2, at 811 (noting Brazil's adoption of a rule permitting international patent and trademark exhaustion).
114. See Report, supra note 9, at 611, 617 ( "[The WTO is based on] one very basic
idea: that the elimination of barriers to the movement of goods and services across and within
national boundaries is beneficial to global economic welfare.... The goal of the WTO is to
lower barriers to trade in goods and services"). The Report does recognize that the WTO does
not share either the E.U. vision of full market integration or the federalism of the United
States. See id. at 618. Therefore, despite the basic WTO "free trade" objectives, the TRIPS
IPRs are not subject to the same "common enterprise" agreements driving the E.U. or the U.S.
view of its internal market. The result is distributional considerations may argue against
common market primacy even if that outcome provides the greatest aggregate benefit.
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the international trade in IP and IP-related goods will apply increasing
pressure to revisit this outcome. The differing national and regional positions will frustrate multinational interests in the marketplace, some
because they are unable to protect premium markets when exhaustion is
locally favored and some because they will find premium markets closed
to them when it is not.' 15
These concerns will find expression not only in the political arena,
but also through individual efforts to obtain extraterritorial application of
"favorable" national laws." 6 A holder, unable to rely on a local, parallel
IPR to prevent lower-cost imports into a high-priced, "exhaustion" market,' may instead seek to prevent the exports by an infringement action
in the lower-priced "non-exhaustion" market."' Conversely, an importing defendant who unsuccessfully raises an exhaustion defense in a
"foreign" contested market might seek to protect its assets in its "home,"
non-exhaustion jurisdiction by arguing the foreign judgment should be
denied enforcement on public policy grounds. 19
Although these pressures demonstrate the practical desirability of a
uniform international approach, 20 they offer no guidance concerning
which "uniform" position on exhaustion to favor. 2' A logical method for
answering this normative question would be to convert the problematic
country-by-country, self-interested assessment into a global level in115. See Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual
Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 617-18 (1997) (noting the inevitable pressures of divergent national approaches to intellectual property protection); Paul
Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategiesfor InternationalIntellectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 69 (1998) (noting the global market's pressures on
the patchwork of territorial IPRs) [hereinafter Geller, Patchwork].
116. Cf. Geller, Patchwork,supra note 115, at 71-73 (noting the same potential for confusion arising under conflicts of laws).
117. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (explaining that domestic consumer
pressure in the high-priced market will weigh heavily in favor of such an approach).
118. Cf. Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein, 19 F. Supp.2d 157, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(noting that extraterritorial enforcement of the Lanham Act looks to connections to the flow of
U.S. commerce). Similar "stream of commerce" notions may be applied elsewhere. For example, the Tokyo Local Court recently found "infringement" of a United States patent by
manufacturing in Japan for export to the United States. See Fujimoto v. K.K. Newron (Tokyo
Dist. Ct., No. 23,109, 1999).
119. Despite comity and recognition of judgments concerns, a local business buying
domestically in a developing country for export will likely make an attractive case for remedying the adverse distributional consequences of the non-exhaustion position taken by the
developed country targeted for the imports.
120. See Chisum, supra note 115, at 617-18; Geller, Patchwork,supra note 115, at 7374 (noting the global market's need for a shift from a patchwork of IPRs to a consistent su-

pranational code).

121. If,as argued in this Article, uniformity proves undesirable (at least for the present)
for other reasons, then these costs must be taken into account in the decision to favor national
autonomy on the exhaustion question. See infra notes 292-309 and accompanying text.
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quiry. If the WTO is viewed as a shared common economic enterprise,
the distributional boundary expands to include all members. The only
question remaining becomes whether common market or IPR primacy
yields the greatest net benefit to the enterprise as a whole. Professor Abbott, Special Rapporteur for TRIPS, takes this approach in his First
Report (Final) to the Committee on International Trade Law of the International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation
(Report).12 His thoughtful discussion provides valuable insights concerning both appropriate conclusions under such a "global" view of the
exhaustion question and its shortcomings.
Proponents of exhaustion, largely the developing countries,' 23 argue
that permitting parallel imports protects local consumers against artificially high prices through increased domestic competition,'2 the very
efficiencies envisioned by the free-trade principles on which the WTO is
predicated.' Additionally, the rule would encourage exports of low-cost
local production, thereby fostering efficient international resource allocation and developing country growth through increased production
investment. 126
Opponents, notably the United States,12' argue that global market
Specifically, a
segmentation can have positive economic effects.'
non-exhaustion rule encourages entry and participation in developing
markets at lower, locally more affordable prices by eliminating them as

122. See Report, supra note 9, at 607.
123. See id. at 609.
124. See id. at 622, 624-25, 631 (discussing patents, copyrights, and trademarks, respectively). See also Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception
to Gray Market Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 376-77 (1994); Lord Sydney
Templeman, Intellectual Property, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 603 (1998).
125. See Report, supra note 9, at 611-12.
126. See id. at 620-21.
127. See id. at 609. The E.U., faced at the time with differences among Member States
on the question, appears to have focused largely on preserving intra-E.U. exhaustion. See id.
This should have put the E.U. on the side of the developing countries. However, preserving
the right to oppose international exhaustion, defined as involving nations outside the E.U.
"internal" market common enterprise, required favoring the United States position. See supra
notes 80-91 and accompanying text (discussing and explaining these seemingly divergent
views on exhaustion). As a consequence, the E.U. position was at best "perplexing" leading to
ambiguous signals. See supra notes 80-91.
128. As Professor Abbott observes, many of these economic arguments mirror those
made in favor of permitting vertical market-divisions under competition laws. These arguments have carried the day in the United States and in a variety of other jurisdictions. See
Report, supra note 9, at 622, 629-30. In addition to the economic arguments, it was also
noted that international exhaustion intrudes on traditional national sovereignty over intellectual property rights. See supra note 57. The normative question, of course, is whether this
national sovereignty should exist in the first place.
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risky sources of cheaper parallel imports back into premium markets.129
Additionally, consumer non-price interests, such as adequate quality
control and availability of local service and support, are protected by
eliminating third party parallel imports. 3 ° Concerning development,
permitting export competition from local industry would retard inflow of
3
the very technologies on which such growth must be predicated.1 1
Additionally, market segmentation maximizes IPR incentives to creation
of IP 3 2 by allowing the holder to generate maximum return from each
national market according to its particular characteristics.'33
Professor Abbott's assessment of these arguments starts by noting
his analytical framework: "[R]ules prohibiting parallel importation [nonexhaustion] are non-tariff barriers to trade that are inconsistent with basic WTO [free-trade] principles. They should be prohibited, absent a
showing that they serve a social welfare purpose that outweighs their
trade-restricting effect."' 3 4 Applying this test, he finds that the offered
social welfare benefits under international exhaustion "can be accomplished by significantly less trade restrictive means, i.e., by private
contract establishing exclusive sales territories . . . .""' He therefore
129. See Report, supra note 9, at 619; Bale, supra note 42, at 648-49.
130. See Bale, supra note 42, at 651-52; Ghosh, supra note 124, at 375-77; Report, supro note 9, at 612, 627.
131. See Bale, supra note 42, at 648.
132. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing incentive to create as the
justification for United States patent and copyright law).
133. In the view of some (notably the pharmaceutical industry), substantial incentive is
essential to encourage the increased investment in research and development necessary to
drive creation. See Bale, supra note 42, at 640-43. But see Long, supra note 5, at 134 (noting
it is unlikely that a national creator actually requires anything beyond the incentives offered
under national law); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 460 (1996) (arguing that little incentive
is added by requiring patent protection in developing countries).
134. Report, supra note 9, at 635.
135. Id. In effect, the "public" position should not subsidize the IPR holder's private efforts at market division. However, Professor Abbott expressly points out that this conclusion
does not preclude the IPR holder from relying on private contract "self-help" within permitted
competition law norms. Id. at 631-32. Relying on private contract to mitigate the potential
costs of an exhaustion position poses two problems. First, the realities of the marketplace
make reliance on contractual solutions, at best, problematic. See, e.g., Tessensohn & Yamamoto, supra note 72, at 734-36 (noting the enforcement problems). Generally, the parallel
importer is not under direct contractual obligation to the IPR holder. A multi-member distribution channel makes it all but impossible to efficiently trace the source of the goods being
imported. Moreover, even if the source under contract can be traced, the problem may be a
breach by an unidentified party further down the chain of distribution. See id. Second, a traditional "rule of reason" approach to enforceability makes it unlikely that contractual restraints
will be of substantial value to the IPR holder. See id. at 739. Under U.S. law, for example, the
existence of vigorous inter-brand competition is key to permitting vertical restraints. See, e.g.,
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Consequently, the situations
in which contractual restrictions are most important to the IPR holder, a high-cost, non-
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comes down firmly on the side of WTO-wide (if not global) common
market primacy and the benefits of free trade.'36
Consequently, the Report proposes an alluringly simple amendment
to TRIPS, mandating international exhaustion with only two narrow exceptions. The amendment would institute a traditional "first sale"
exhaustion rule, prohibiting any IPR based restrictions on imports after a
good or service is "[put] on the market of any [VTO] Member with the
consent of the intellectual property rights holder."' 37 The first exception
concerns price controls and compulsory licensing in connection with
public health goods. Professor Abbott suggests that in this situation
limitations on exports may be appropriate to avoid "export subsidies"
favoring local manufacturing and distribution interests at the expense of
the IPR holder.' The second exception recognizes the "unique characteristics of the broadcast and performance market,"'39 in particular the
holder's dependence on "earnings from repeated communications of the
same work to the public."' ° He suggests that it may, therefore, be appropriate to protect holders facing this special difficulty
by not treating
• 141
public performances as exhaustion triggering first sales.
competitive market, will provide the weakest basis for enforceability. Such private contract
efforts may also conflict with other "free flow" public policies, such as the E.U.'s prohibition
restricting parallel imports. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 81, at 633-34.
136. See Report, supra note 9, at 635.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 635-36. At one point Professor Abbott appears to focus on free trade export subsidy concerns instead of the free trade versus IPR economic arguments. See id. at 623.
The wording of the proposed exception, however, returns to "impairment" of the IPR holders'
rights. This language presumably means that the harm to IPR objectives (in this case, incentives to create) resulting from the price caps and/or compulsory licensing requirements
justifies the limitation on international free trade. See id. at 635. Understood in this broader,
and more accurate, manner, the concern is not simply about price caps or compulsory licenses
of public health related goods. The same issue arises any time the national decision-maker
determines that "other social values" should trump "standard" IP protection objectives
(including those incorporated in TRIPS) and limits the scope of the national IPR. The question of how to handle the full range of this national "trumping" behavior requires substantially
more attention than given by the Report. For a discussion of the serious barrier to reaching
consensus on exhaustion presented by divergent national norms, see infra text accompanying
notes 214-57.
139. Report, supra note 9, at 636.
140. Id.
141. See id. Again, the issue is more complex than the single exemplar indicates. Treating any form of distribution as a first-sale reduces the IPR's value to the holder. The critical
question therefore is not whether the holder "depends" on the distribution to obtain return but
how cutting off further return under a particular form of distribution should affect the common market versus IPR primacy decision. For example, it must also be determined whether
videotape or software rentals should or should not be considered as triggering first sales. The
question does not turn on "dependence" of the IPR holder on repeated transactions, but on
when IPR objectives should yield to free-trade benefits. See discussion infra notes 150-77 and
accompanying text.
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Professor Abbott's conclusion is well supported. Efficiency theory
strongly suggests that maximum economic performance depends on
removing barriers, IPR or otherwise, to market forces. International
acceptance of this argument provides, as he notes, the fundamental
justification for creating the WTO. Additionally, as his "less restrictive
means" analysis points out, contract law mitigation provides a vehicle
for obtaining these substantial free-trade benefits with very little
offsetting cost. 142 Finally, his conclusion finds extraordinarily convincing
real-world advocates. Faced with actual rather than theoretical
consequences, national and regional common enterprise decisionmakers
have virtually unanimously adopted internal market "first sale
exhaustion" primacy.
As persuasive as these arguments are, some doubts remain.
Reasonable people making valid points can, and do, reach conflicting
conclusions. 43 Even Professor Abbott points out the lack of definitive
empirical evidence makes it difficult to have confidence in any
conclusion, no matter how soundly reasoned it might appear.'" What
may work within limited internal national or regional markets may not
readily translate into a "worldwide" rule. As he notes, one particular
missing "fact" makes the leap from a local to general pro-exhaustion
conclusion especially risky.' 4 Many significant exporting economies,
most notably the United States and the European Union, currently
adhere to an "external" non-exhaustion position. The status quo may
therefore be holding back a large dormant parallel import market which
would be "unleashed" by the change. The effects could be precisely
those posited by the exhaustion opponents: substantially reduced
availability of products in lower priced markets, a marked increase in
worldwide prices, or both.'46

142. But see supra note 135 (noting the difficulties with this argument under national
competition law).
143. See Adelman & Baldia, supra note 43, at 508-11; Bale, supra note 42, at 652-53;

Kitch, supra note 96 at 166-68.
144. See Report, supra note 9, at 613.

145. See id.
146. Professor Abbott does not return to assess this possibility in connection with his
pro-exhaustion position. The E.U. experience provides a significant test of the international
waters and the results, to date at least, arguably indicate the concern may be more theory than

substance. However, the E.U. common enterprise consensus (as well as relative economic
parity, across the worldwide spectrum at least) may be controlling reaction to the distributional consequences of free trade. Its absence in the WTO context might well generate more
self-interested behavior and the predicted consequences.
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III.

BROADENING THE DISCUSSION

Focusing exclusively on the merits of the opposing economic arguments, however, risks overlooking the much more serious difficulties
with the common enterprise approach taken in the Report.'47 First, even
in a "perfect" world of harmonized economic utility based IPRs and objectives, the different justifications supporting the various distinct
regimes (patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets) dictate conflicting outcomes on exhaustion. Second, even appropriately refined to
reflect these differences, the "common enterprise" assumption ignores,
much less resolves, the decision-makers' conflicting positions generated
by the very real differences in wealth distribution under the alternative
positions on international exhaustion. Finally, there is substantial evidence that, despite superficial appearances, TRIPS does not represent
real consensus that goods and services wealth maximization is the proper
single justification for international IPRs. Such disagreement runs
deeper than dividing economic wealth. Rather, there remain substantial
differences over what constitutes value in the pursuit of the human enterprise. Examination of each of these considerations reveals that a
unified "yes or no" resolution on international exhaustion is, in present
circumstances at least, unachievable and, more importantly, undesirable.
A. Different Categoriesof Intellectual Property Rights
The Report notes at the outset that it is erroneous to assume a monolithic justification for the IPRs granted under all intellectual property
regimes.'" This position is non-controversial, with general agreement
that despite the uniform "property" label, significantly different policies
justify the various specific rights across the spectrum of protections.
However, the Report's analysis makes very little of these differences,
and no mention appears in the conclusion. 49 Far from a trivial omission,
this failure glosses over the insurmountable barrier these varying objectives pose to adopting the "one size fits all" proposal offered by
Professor Abbott.

147. Professor Abbott clearly states the Report is only intended to address the exhaustion issue in "broad economic terms." See Report, supra note 9, at 607. The conclusion is not,
however, qualified in the same way, and it must be. Although the Report may properly answer
the economic question, its narrow focus omits or ignores additional important considerations
making its recommendations similarly incomplete.
148. See Report, supra note 9, at 612, 614.
149. While the Report assesses each primary regime separately, it finds no fundamental
differences in outcome, a particularly striking omission in the case of trademark law given its
consumer confusion focus. See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
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A brief review of the United States' array of intellectual property
rights'50 clearly demonstrates how fundamental differences in specific
justifications, even within its overall market-utility policy context, dictate conflicting conclusions concerning exhaustion.'' The U.S. patent
and copyright laws exist primarily to foster creation of certain types of
intellectual products for society's benefit."' The incentive takes the form
of legally enforceable rights to exclude others' use of the resulting IP for
limited periods of time. 5 3 In this framework, the primary policy objective is achieving an appropriate balance between the public cost of the
investor's exclusionary rights (in the form of rents and, additionally in
the case of copyrights, interference with the freedom of discourse and
expression) and the resulting public benefits (primarily from the right to
use the "encouraged" creation on expiration of the patent or copyright
term). 154
This same policy balance, therefore, should drive the patent and
copyright exhaustion outcome. In common enterprise terms, the question
is which position achieves the proper balance between private incentives
(costs) and public access (benefits).'5 5 If encouraging the necessary investment requires permitting the investor/PR holder to maximize return
by segmenting the international market through parallel IPRs, then non150. Not only does the well-developed body of U.S. intellectual property law provide a
good vehicle for identifying the policy differences among regimes, but the TRIPS IPRs are
largely based on United States utility/market efficiency premises. See infra note 180.
151. The analysis in the text below is over-simplified, as indicated in the footnotes, to
focus on the more general points. It also assumes that the theories described actually work. It
is far from a forgone conclusion that even the established intellectual property regimes like
those in the United States have it right. For example, there is little empirical evidence that
U.S. copyright laws draw a proper balance between incentives and the commons, particularly
given recent extensions in the term of protection. The propertization of trademark law is
equally problematic. See infra note 160. We are not even certain that trade secret law should
exist. See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEo. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999) (noting
the need for a normative foundation, which is proposed). It is unclear that before these serious
questions are resolved there should be any great rush to perform a global transplant of those
values as guidelines to the rest of the world.
152. The Constitution expressly authorizes Congressional enactment of the patent and
copyright laws to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." See U.S. CONST. Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8; Vincent Chiappetta, Patentabilityof Computer Software Instruction as an "Article
of Manufacture:" Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 89, 97-99 (1998).
153. Patents and copyrights address the "public goods" market failure, which destroys
incentive to invest in creation because of inability to obtain a reasonable return. See Chiappetta, supra note 151, at 86-87.
154. See id. at 88-89.
155. The question of who specifically receives the benefits and bears the costs raises serious distributional issues that are considered separately below. See infra notes 181-93 and
accompanying text.
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exhaustion should be favored.' 6 If that segmentation provides surplus
returns, they represent7 an unjustified public expense and exhaustion is
the appropriate rule.'1
On this basis, a logical case can be made that a single "yes or no"
answer depends only on assembling the necessary data. However, even
this straightforward balancing test may still dictate variable responses.
For example, although overall the empirical evidence might support a
general rule favoring exhaustion, individual circumstances may justify a
variety of exceptions. Encouraging the especially high investment necessary in certain industries (for example, pharmaceuticals) may require
levels of potential return only available through international market
segmentation, while other, less resource intensive activities may not.
Similarly, certain activities likely to produce significant social benefits
(such as increased agricultural yields or new medical technologies) may
be sufficiently important to justify erring in favor of over-incenting
those types of investments in the face of empirical uncertainties concerning the proper level of return required.' 8 If the evidence dictated a
contrary result overall, the exceptions would be driven by the opposite
considerations, for example, a demonstrably lower need for encouragement. Nonetheless, provided adequate assurances existed that the
incentive system would deliver net benefits in the aggregate, these questions of degree could be ignored to obtain the administrative efficiency
of a single, uniform rule. 5 9
The far more significant impediment to a "universal" rule remains
the differing justifications for the various IPR regimes. Although patent
and copyright law follows similar incentive patterns, trademark law
156. Cf Bale, supra note 42, at 641-44 (noting size of investments in pharmaceuticals).
157. Cf. Long, supra note 5, at 134 (querying whether mandated national IPRs are necessary to produce the requisite incentive). The debate over whether the national incentive/cost
balance has been appropriately drawn will affect the decision. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, An
Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) (arguing that extending the term of United States
copyright protection under was unnecessary, an argument recently given new life by the
Copyright Term Extension Act); Templeman, supra note 124, at 604 (making the same arguments about United Kingdom patent and copyright term extensions). For example, those that
view the term of national protection as too long or the regime as totally unnecessary, are
likely to believe that no additional incentive through international market segmentation is
required. See Templeman, supra note 124 at 605-06.
158. Additionally, distribution methods or other specifics may argue for greater circumspection concerning the events triggering exhaustion. See supra notes 139-141 and
accompanying text (discussing the public broadcast exception in the Report and similar issues).
159. This is the basic approach taken in U.S. patent and copyright law. The strains of
special circumstance adjustments are, however, visible in a few different areas. See 17 U.S.C.
§§ 107-120 (1994) (listing a variety of exceptions to the holder's rights in copyright law); 35
U.S.C. § 271(e) (1994) (listing biotechnology exceptions in patent law).
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focuses instead on preventing consumer confusion as to source.IW Even
at the most general level of analysis, this objective dictates at least a bifurcated exhaustion rule. If the same holder"' l markets substantially
similar goods under the trademark in each jurisdiction, then consumer
162
confusion is unlikely and exhaustion, free-flow benefits should prevail.
If, however, there are material differences among the holder's local
products bearing the trademark, then permitting parallel-trade in these
products would be utterly inconsistent with the consumer protection underpinnings of trademark law. 63 This bifurcated trademark outcome on
exhaustion is entirely independent of the patent/copyright incentive calculation and must conflict in part with whatever "general" rule (for or
against exhaustion) that policy generates. 64

160. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI§ 2.8 at 2-15, § 6.3 at 6-5 (4th ed. 1996). Unlike United States patent and copyright
law, which follows the Constitutional mandate of "progress of science and the useful arts,"
federal trademark law finds its justification in the Commerce Clause. See In re Trademark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). The "consumer confusion" objective fits within the efficiency
model by providing incentives to product quality and reducing consumer search costs. See
MCCARTHY, supra, §§ 2.3-2.5 at 2-3 to 2-9. Despite the recent trend toward increased incentive-style "property" rights, consumer confusion remains the primary policy touchstone.
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108
YALE L. J. 1687 (1999) (noting this trend and arguing that it is unjustified).
161. What constitutes the "same holder" for trademark exhaustion purposes can be a
complex inquiry. See, e.g., K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 489 U.S. 281 (1988); Donnelly,
supra note 63, at 455-56 (discussing "common control" under K mart Corp.). See also Case
192/73, Van Zuyleu Freres v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 127 (1973)
[hereinafter Hag I]; Case 10/89, SA CNL-Sucal NV v. Hag GF AG, 1990 E.C.R. 3711,
[1990] C.M.L.R. 571 (1990) [hereinafter Hag II]; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 81, at 421
(discussing Hag I and Hag I1); Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 681-82 (discussing common
control under U.S. law); Donnelly, supra note 63, 480-81 (discussing the common origin
issue under E.U. law, specifically Hag I and Hag If).
162. See Donnelly, supra note 63, at 456-58, 478 (discussing basic first sale exhaustion
under U.S. law and E.U. law); supra note 92 (discussing, among other things, first sale exhaustion of U.S. trademark rights). See also Case 3/78, Centrafarm BV v. American Home
Products, 1978 E.C.R. 1823, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 326 (1978); Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v.
Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480 (1974); BERMANN ET AL, supra
note 81, at 410-17 (discussing intra-E.U. first sale exhaustion, including the Centrafarm
cases).
163. See Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 662 (discussing the use of common control
and the material differences exception by the United Kingdom), 682-86 (discussing "material
difference" under U.S. law); Donnelly, supra note 63, at 456-58 (discussing what constitutes
a material difference under U.S. law), 478-80 (discussing repackaging concerns under E.U.
law); Littman, supra note 87, at 499-500 (noting that the E.U. approach should follow the
"material difference" split).
164. The Report notes the consumer confusion basis for trademark law. See Report, supra note 9, at 628-29. The consumer protection arguments apparently were rejected based on
lack of empirical evidence of a "systematic problem." See id. at 629. This outcome erroneously mixes questions of proof and policy. The objectives of trademark law require the rule on
exhaustion to prevent trademark use that may lead to consumer confusion. The courts in the
TION,
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Trade secret law 6 presents yet a third policy framework. Trade secret law is predicated on preventing "takings" which interfere with
leveraged use of confidential information, threaten public order, or give
rise to inefficient investment in self-help protection.' Involuntary takings, addressed by the latter two policy objectives, do not involve holder
authorized product "first sales" and, consequently, do not trigger exhaustion concerns. 67 Holder or licensee' sales of products incorporating
the trade secret, however, do raise the issues. The related leveraging
policy objective dictates the response. Unlike patent law, the holder's
trade secret right does not automatically apply "against the world." It
only provides presumptive enforcement of quid pro quo restrictions on
use or disclosure imposed in connection with permitting access to holder
controlled information.' 69 The conflict is readily apparent: trade secret
leveraging objectives specifically support (and require) presumptive enforceability of the very restrictions first sale exhaustion would
eliminate. 70 Preventing holder enforcement of restrictions on the
United States and the E.U. have long followed precisely this approach. See supra notes 161-

163.
165. TRIPS expressly covers "Protection of Undisclosed Information." See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39. Because of substantial variations in national views conceming the existence, to say nothing of the reach, of trade secret protection, prior to TRIPS
only NAFTA had expressly addressed the subject. See Long, supra note 5, at 144 n.53. As I
argue elsewhere, the recognition of trade secrets as part of intellectual property law is fully
justified. See Chiappetta, supra note 151, at 69-75. Consequently, these rights must also be
considered in terms of exhaustion.
166. The policy justifications for trade secret law have been quite confused, relying on
"incentive to invention and commercial ethics." If this is correct, at least the incentive to invention justification would track the same arguments concerning exhaustion as made for
patent and copyright law. However, justifying trade secret law based on incentive to invention
creates unacceptable overlaps with patent law and surplus incentives. Instead, the regime
should be founded on the justifications noted in the text. See id.
167. It could be argued that because of its particular characteristics merely invoking
trade secret protection to prevent involuntary takings technically involves its "use" by the
holder. Because such claims do not seek to restrict a subsequent owner's use of a product
voluntarily put on the market, for exhaustion purposes involuntary takings are more properly
viewed as comparable to infringements in the other regimes.
168. The license of the trade secret information should not trigger exhaustion. A contrary result would limit trade secret value to the holder's direct use, entirely defeating the
leveraging objective supporting the duty misappropriation right. See Chiappetta, supra note
151 at 97-103 (describing the appropriate limitations on the leveraging incentive).
169. The requirements include adequacy of notice and holder bona fides. See id. at 99102, 121-27. Attempts to prohibit reverse engineering or to impose restrictions at mass trade
secret licensing pose special policy problems and are exceptions to enforceability of quid pro
quo restrictions. See id. at 127-32. These exceptions are, however, limitations on trade secret
rights themselves, not an exhaustion argument.
170. See id. at 98-99. This argument is a policy "super-set" of the Report's argument in
favor of permitting private agreement restrictions provided they are consistent with competition law. See Report, supra note 9, at 635. Trade secret law provides the necessary policy
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free-flow of goods, including specifically those preventing flow of
goods outside limited geographic markets, goes to the core of trade
secret leveraging protection. The issue, therefore, is not whether trade71
secret rights should be exhausted, but whether they should exist at all.1
Once it is determined they should, only a rule against their "exhaustion"
makes logical sense.171
Even within the United States' coherent market-utility framework,
each regime's distinct implementation of that policy requires separate
weighing of its specific social welfare benefits against the costs of
restricting free flow of goods. A uniform exhaustion response covering
all regimes depends therefore on coincidence, not overlapping
justifications. As the above discussion demonstrates, such a lucky
coincidence does not exist. Consequently, only a collection of varying,
regime-dependent exhaustion rules can appropriately reflect the range of
supporting justifications.
Comparing Apples to Apples: It is a tautology to say that international exhaustion should apply only to parallel national IPRs."' When
applying this directive, however, we need to guard against over-reliance
on the labels applied to the IPRs at issue. The above demonstrated need
to focus on the specific justifications when formulating appropriate
"rules of exhaustion" for a particular IPR regime, extends with just as
much force to ensuring the proper application of those rules.
The E.C.J. decision in Warner Brothers. v. Christensen174 provides a
good example. The plaintiff held both United Kingdom (U.K.) and
Danish "copyrights" in a particular film. The holder authorized the sale
of videocassettes in the U.K. under its U.K. rights. Defendant lawfully
purchased authorized cassettes in the U.K. and exported them to Denmark for rental. Danish law, unlike U.K. law, provided a specific right to
justification for public law enforcement of private restraints found lacking in the Report. See
id. at 631-32.
171. The contest is not between the benefits of extended enforcement and free-flow of
goods, but the net effect of permitting restrictions on free-flow of goods under the original
right. Much simplified, the supporting argument is that, properly limited by notice and bona
fides, without the encouragement trade secret law provides to share the necessary controlled
information the goods whose flow is restricted by agreement would not exist in the first place.
See Chiappetta, supra note 151, at 97-99.
172. It would be possible, of course, to limit trade secret rights to non-geographic restrictions on use (product lines). These limits, however, would ignore the basic leveraging
argument that without enforceability much, if not all, of the very trade to be freed from restriction would not exist at all. See id.
173. This maxim is so strong that most commentators simply assume it within the
structure of their analysis, discussing patents, copyrights and trademarks separately. See, e.g.,
Report, supra note 9, passim; Donnelly, supra note 63, passim.
174. Case 158/86, Warner Brothers Inc. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605 (1998). See
Report, supra note 9, at 625-26 (discussing the case and its implications).
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prevent rentals. The holder asserted those Danish rights precluded any
rental in Denmark of the cassettes purchased in the U.K. The E.C.J.
noted that, whereas the U.K. IPR was limited to sales, the Danish IPR
focused specifically on providing the holder a "satisfactory share" of the
distinct rental market. 75 The Court therefore concluded that, to avoid
rendering the distinct Danish rental right "worthless," it could not be
exhausted by a first sale under the U.K. rights. 7 6 As the case demonstrates, the critical exhaustion question is not whether both rights are
labeled "copyrights" but the congruence (or incongruence) of the unobjectives, there
derlying policy justifications. Absent parallel policy
sale. 77
simply are no parallel IPRs to exhaust by a first
The Harmonization Solution: The Report concludes that Christensen
demonstrates "a certain harmonization of national policies on questions
such as video rental rights may need to be reached before a uniform
'first sale' rule can be recognized with respect to videocassettes."' 78 This
observation, although accurate, ignores both the broader range of similar
disconnects among national rights and the possible general application
of the suggested policy harmonization solution to the entire exhaustion
problem. 79 Specifically, the substantive harmonization mandated by
175. See Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. at 2612.
176. See id. at 2630.
177. The same consideration is visible within U.S. copyright law. A copyright holder is
granted a variety of rights, including the right to copy and perform. The first-sale of a particular recording does not "exhaust" the copyright holder's right to prevent public
performances of the composition. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1), 106(4), 109 (1994); ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE, 444-51
(describing the numerous complexities of the performance rights in music). See also Case
402/85, G. Basset v. SACEM, 1987 E.C.R. 1747, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 173 (1987){holding
similarly, based on the even stronger French right to royalties on the sale as well as the playing of a recording to a paying audience).
178. See Report, supra note 9, at 626. TRIPS expressly provides for rental rights regarding computer programs and cinematographic works but not for sound recordings. See
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1,art. 11.
179. Not coincidentally, the E.U. has noted that harmonization, or more precisely approximation, of national laws is an essential feature of creating the single market predicate to
a rule of "internal" exhaustion. See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 64, art. G(B)(2) (amending
the EEC Treaty, supra note 81, art. 3); Baudenbacher, supra note 71, at 656-58 (noting particularly that the E.U. Trademark Directive relies on harmonization to eliminate barriers to
free movement); Uhich Loewenheim, Harmonizationand Intellectual Property in Europe, 2
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 481, 481-83 (1996). A natural extension of national law harmonization is
the creation of E.U.-wide IPRs. See Loewenheim, supra, at 483-84 (discussing efforts to
create a Community patent and trademark). Internal market harmonization of IPRs is also
readily apparent in the United States as well, including the direct federalization of patent and
copyright law, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994); 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1994), the creation
of national trademark rights under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994), and,
most recently, in the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 et seq. (1998),
which made trade secret misappropriation a federal criminal offense.'
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TRIPS may indicate fundamental accord among the signatories that
U.S.-style economic utility principles justify and define the proper objectives for WTO-wide IPRs.'O Not only would such a consensus offer a
basis for achieving full harmonization of national IPRs, it might provide
the basis for agreement concerning a single set of properly nuanced international rules on their exhaustion as outlined above.
B. The Allocation Problem
Closer analysis reveals, however, that utility-based harmonization of
national IPRs is not sufficient to guarantee consensus on international
exhaustion. As discussed earlier, distributional concerns drive exhaustion decisions, with each decisionmaker considering not merely whether
common market or IPR primacy maximizes overall wealth, but also how
it will fare distributionally under each alternative.' 8 ' At the international
level, the vital common enterprise distributional boundary will be at best
regional and, most frequently, national. The members of the international trading community have no joint sharing agreement concerning
the distribution of the resulting free trade and IPR benefits. 2 Consequently, the WTO institutions, unlike those of a national government or
the E.U., cannot be given common enterprise decision-making authority
on exhaustion."' Instead each member retains and exercises the right to
maximize its own interests.184
The international exhaustion disagreement therefore rests, at least in
part, on the unresolved profoundly different benefit allocations between
IP "haves" and "have-nots" under the two primacy alternatives. Those
having little domestic IP industry and premium domestic IP-related
goods markets are generally enthusiastic supporters of common market
180. The TRIPS rights are predicated on agreed policy predicates among the developed
nations. See Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 17, at 586 (noting that the TRIPS
IPRs reflect the standards agreeable to the developed nations); Ullrich, supra note 5, at 184
(making a similar argument). Although much of the basic structure comes from international
treaties, such as the Berne and Paris Conventions, the U.S. economic utility policy influence
and limitation is apparent in a variety of places, for example the express failure to cover moral
rights. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9(1); cf.Long, supra note 5, at 153.
181. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of common enterprise to reaching resolution).
182. See id. The WTO dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly those related to
TRIPS, focus on enforcement of treaty obligations, not making adjustments for potentially
inequitable results from their application. See Matthijs Geuze and Hannu Wager, WTO Dispute Settlement PracticeRelating to the TRIPS Agreement, 2 J.INT'L ECON. L. 347 (1999).
183. See Report, supra note 9, at 618.
184. Cf.Long, supra note 5, at 162-63 (noting that nations pursue their self-interests
first). Not incidentally, the creation of the TRIPS minimum IPRs itself is an expression of
precisely this type of national self-interest, in this case the developed nations seeking to prevent "free-riding" on their investment in IP by the developing nations. See supra notes 92-94.
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primacy free-trade exhaustion. Those with strong domestic IP industry
and an efficient, relatively low-priced domestic IP-related goods market,
will quite properly (on self-interested economic grounds at least)'85 seek
to protect the net in-bound wealth transfer to their IP creators
made pos16
sible by IPR primacy non-exhaustion market segmentation.
Even the most ardent market economics adherent recognizes that
although the theory provides a mechanism (efficiency) for assessing the
economic effects of these conflicting positions, it does not definitively
resolve them." The claim that removing IPR impediments to the natural
operation of the market will maximize aggregate wealth creation, even if
true,' 8 hardly dictates a participant will agree to such a system when
other approaches offer greater individual benefits. 9 In terms of absolute

quantity, obtaining a bigger piece of a smaller pie may be preferable to a
smaller piece of a bigger one.
The Report specifically acknowledges the problem, noting that its
proposed rule of international exhaustion "may have the effect of transferring wealth from more highly developed countries to less highly
developed countries. ' It goes on to ask the question: "However, assuming arguendo that a rule of international exhaustion ... would
185. Cf. Abbott, supra note 30, at 386 (noting the OECD countries "cannot be faulted
for pursuing the TRIPS agreement"). It is worth noting that the developing countries also
resort to barriers to trade such as tariffs to enhance their own self-interests.
186. We should not, however, lose track of the fact that these positions are largely an
artifact of the Western definition of protectable IP. If protection were extended to matter
found in less industrial cultures, such as folk remedies, stories, designs and the like, the question would be much more complex for both the developed and the developing countries. Cf.
Long, Cultures, supra note 95, at 263-80 (arguing for adjustment of intellectual property laws
to protect developing country cultures).
187. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998) 14-15,
26-29. Judge Posner points out that Kaldor-Hicks potential Pareto superiority reflects but
does not provide normative guidance as to appropriate distributional patterns. Therefore, although efficiency analysis provides important inputs as to economic costs and benefits of
different decisions, the final distributional decision remains one of "ultimate" values and outside the competence of market economics theory. See id. at 16; Chiappetta, supra note 151, at
93 n.154.
188. See POSNER, supra note 187, at 17-23, 29-31 (noting criticisms of the economic
approach).
189. It could be argued that IPRs represent part of the a priori decision on resource distribution (like other property rights, they create resource "ownership" and control, in this case
over IP). In this light, non-exhaustion wealth transfers are merely part of the efficient allocation process of the market by recognizing the value of intellectual property. This, however,
presupposes creating independent national IPRs is the appropriate resolution of the "public
goods" market failure problem faced by IP creators. See supra note 153 (discussing the public
goods problem). This, in turn, raises the question of why the countries with minimal domestic
IP industries agreed to the creation of TRIPS mandated IPRs in the first place. See infra notes
197-213 and accompanying text (exploring the coercive nature of the TRIPS accord).
190. Report, supra note 9, at 624.

MichiganJournal ofInternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:333

benefit the developing countries at some expense to the industrialized
countries, is this a reason to oppose such a rule?"'9' Professor Abbott
responds that the answer is subjective, varying depending on whether
local or global interests are to be preferred. 92 He concludes that adoption
of the proposed exhaustion rule will therefore depend on whether local
or global perspectives prevail within the arena of international politics.
Although practically correct, this approach hardly provides normative
support for the Report's pro-exhaustion position. Developing an appropriate response requires pressing beyond political power to determine
whether group (global) or individual participant (local) interests should
be preferred. An answer to this question and the dependent question of
whether to favor international exhaustion requires further analysis.
C. A TRIPS Conundrum and the Response: Persistence
ofNormative Differences
The developed--developing country distributional conflict raises a
basic conundrum. Why did the developing countries agree to TRIPS at
all? Without the TRIPS mandated IPRs, the protectionist rights on which
the developed countries' non-exhaustion position rests largely disappear,
leaving the developing countries' free-market option by default. Unraveling the mystery of why the developing economies did not insist on
resolution of the exhaustion allocation question before assenting to the
rights which create the problematic wealth transfers reveals how much
normative work remains, not only on exhaustion, but on the overall international intellectual property agenda.
One obvious explanation would be that the developing countries believed they stood to gain more from the creation of mandated WTOwide minimum IPRs than they would lose in wealth transfers to the IP
creators in developed nations. In effect, their share of the resulting overall increase in wealth allowed them to ignore any inequities in allocation.
The history of the TRIPS negotiations fails to support this position. If
the developing countries viewed WTO-wide harmonized IPRs as being
to their benefit, they would have been agreed upon and implemented
energetically (if not unilaterally) without the acrimony which character191. Id.
192. See id.
193. The subjective answer to the question is an emphatic, contradictory preference for
"local" interests from every WTO member who stands to lose under the exhaustion rule
whether or not they have the political power to implement their preference. Professor Abbot
does not, however, appear to view power-based decisions (political or otherwise) as a basis
for questioning the normative foundations for the Report's implicit assumption that "global"
interests should be preferred. See id.
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ized the actual discussions. 94 Another alternative might be that the developing nations received other valuable compensating concessions.9
Both the meagerness of the quid pro quo and its non-delivery, however,
make it unlikely that the developing countries viewed the promises received as a fair trade for the value they surrendered. 96 The answer to the
mystery does not lie in the developing countries' pursuit of self-interest.
It must be found elsewhere.
A more enlightening approach lies in questioning the basic assumption that TRIPS reflects multilateral consensus: that developing nations
actually signed on despite continued disagreement. Paul Geller's "legal
transplant" framework reveals how this might have come to pass. 197 The
TRIPS accords involve a "legal transplant," inserting foreign, utilitybased IPR regimes into the developing economies' body of law.'9 One
important measure of transplant success is whether the recipient has
merely "simulated [the] legal jargon, but not necessarily the values underlying [the] law," '99 in essence only feigning agreement. Geller's
observation that this behavior is particularly likely when coercion is present provides the missing connection necessary to resolve the mystery.
Although TRIPS is articulated in terms of "agreement," the conundrum
of developing country assent evaporates if it actually is no more than
grudging acquiescence in face of unrelenting developed country demands for stronger IPRs under the threat of trade reprisals if agreement

194. See supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text (describing the TRIPS negotiation
process).
195. See Abbott, supra note 30, at 387-88 (1996) (describing the range of concessions
obtained in return, including particularly the United States agreement to press the European
Union for reductions in agricultural subsidies, concessions on tropical product imports and
quotas on textile products).
196. The agricultural subsidies are still hotly debated in the current WTO meetings. See
Elizabeth Olson, Global Trade Harmony? Yeah, Right, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1999, at C2;
Elizabeth Olson, World Trade Group's Leader Says Discord Threatens Talks, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 6, 1999, at B18. It is equally unlikely that the transition periods provide the developing
countries a net gain under TRIPS. Cf.Abbott, supra note 40, at 387-88 (noting that the substantial transition periods represent an important concession to developing country interests).
The transition periods may have made TRIPS more palatable through deferral of implementation. It is unlikely, however, that many of the developing economies actually expected to join
the ranks of the developed world within the transition periods as would be necessary to participate in the real benefits of TRIPS-enhanced IP protection. Consequently it is unlikely
WTO membership itself is an adequate "carrot." But see Vicente, supra note 79, at 1109
(suggesting that it might be). Without actual delivery of the necessary trade liberalizations
benefiting developing countries even MFN status does not account for much. Certainly the
dispute resolution mechanisms offer little to the parties most likely to be the defendants.
197. See Geller, supra note 19, at 199.
198. See id. at 199 (stating that a "legal transplant" involves the introduction of a legal
notion or rule developed in a "source" body of law into another "host" body of law).
199. Id. at 208.
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were not achieved." The need to "placate momentarily better-equipped
Western invaders" 20' is no less imperative when the threats involve economic sanctions rather than military might.2°2
In addition to clarifying the developing countries' behavior, coercion also explains the remarkably un-WTO, non-free-trade TRIPS
outcome. The accord is best viewed as a successful effort by the developed countries to use the WTO treaty machinery to pursue other
countervailing policies. °3 TRIPS without agreement on exhaustion was
not added to the WTO agenda to enhance trade, but specifically to limit
it. IPR protections for IP creators, regardless of the justifications, run
counter to basic free trade in related goods and services. When coupled
with a failure to agree on IPR exhaustion, those protectionist objectives
become expressly preferred in the global marketplace. Whether or not
the overall benefits from pursuing these objectives outweigh the costs,
the distributional effects very clearly favor IP creators at the expense of
consumers (in the short-run at least) and, consequently, generally developed countries over developing countries. 2° Instead of international
consensus on IPR policy and related rights followed by inexplicable
collapse on exhaustion, TRIPS reflects the least damaging "accord"
available to parties holding inferior but not de minimis bargaining
power.0 5 After bowing to the IPR demands and facing intransigence but
reduced vigor on exhaustion, the developing countries managed a "tie"
on the latter. 2°6
Geller's concept of "open-ended [legal] notions" provides additional
support for this interpretation.2 7 Open-endedness occurs as a way of
200. See Abbott, supra note 40, at 388-89; Doane, supra note 41, at 466.
201. Geller, supra note 19, at 208.

202. See ALFORD, ELEGANT OFFENSE, supra note 96, at 30-55; Alford, Making Safe,
supra note 96, at 137-39; Jill Chiang Fung, Can Mickey Mouse Prevail in the Court of the
Monkey King? Enforcing Foreign Intellectual Property Rights in the People's Republic of
China, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 613,635-36 (1996).

203. See Brian F. Fitzgerald, Trade-Based Constitutionalisms: The Framework for Universalizing Substantive International Law?, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 111 (1997) (querying
the appropriateness of including substantive issues, like intellectual property harmonization,
in trade negotiations).
204. See supra notes 99-102.
205. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Over-

protective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 616 (1996) (noting the "imposition" of Western
intellectual property systems on other cultures); Jerome H. Reichman, IntellectualProperty in
International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRAtNSNAT'L L. 747, 813 (1989) (noting that "imposition of foreign legal standards on unwilling

states in the name of harmonization remains today what Ladas deemed it in 1975, namely a
polite form of economic imperialism.").
206. The individual decision-making compromise permits a developed county to protect
its domestic market but gives it no control over parallel trade between "foreign" markets.
207. See Geller, supra note 19, at 209.

Spring 2000]

The Desirabilityof Agreeing to Disagree

permitting agreement without full resolution in "hard legal cases, where
the meanings of key terms are disputed." 2°8 TRIPS failure to provide
specific content for the many labels of intellectual property law 2°9 leaves
it replete with "open-ended" language.1 The copyright provisions offer
a clear example. TRIPS offers an objective definition for neither the
protected class of IP ("literary and artistic works") nor the hotly debated
concept of "originality." Instead, negotiators retained the Berne status
quo, incorporating it by reference. Consequently, although there may
be some convergence on basic rights granted, the question of precisely
which works receive protection remains unresolved. As under Berne,
applicability of the TRIPS-mandated rights can be interpreted more or
less expansively depending on the role ascribed to the specific list of
examples (representative or exhaustive) and the requisite level of originality imposed.2 1' This outcome is precisely what would be expected in
an agreement driven by parties having enough negotiating leverage to
force agreement but inadequate power to prevail fully. Disagreements
are sufficiently masked to permit signing an accord. 3
Coercion means that the developed nations' justifications for IPRs
were less than enthusiastically embraced by the developing countries.
Although TRIPS edges the developing countries reluctantly toward economic utility-based IPRs, very real normative differences remain.
Nations will therefore take every opportunity found in the flexibility of
208. Id. Geller applauds the usefulness of the concept of permitting cultural flexibility in
interpretation. See id. at 223. In the TRIPS context, that same flexibility, however, permits an
unintended lack of agreement on fundamental principles. Once disagreement is acknowledged, I agree that the better approach is to permit the necessary "give" in application. See
infra note 213 (discussing Geller's acknowledgement of the issue); infra note 286 and accompanying text (arguing for continued flexibility within an affirmative agreement to disagree on
exhaustion).
209. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a
Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Rosemary J. Coombe,
Challenging Paternity:Historiesof Copyright, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397, 398 (1994) (book
review) (explaining that many terms critical to intellectual property law have no "self-evident

referents").
210. See Long, Cultures, supra note 95, at 263-68.
211. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9(1); Geller, supra note 19, at 211. See
also Long, supra note 5, at 153 (noting similar definitional concerns concerning coverage of
computer programs).
212. See Geller, supra note 19, at 211-12, 221-23. Geller notes similar problems with
the idea-expression dichotomy. See id.
213. Geller approves of this flexibility as a vehicle for permitting "creative options that
come into play in concrete cases." See id. at 223. That view is appropriate if the parties understand they disagree. The "open-ended" language in the TRIPS context, however, is being used

by the coerced party to "fudge" agreement. The consequence will be subsequent disputes over
divergent interpretations and implementations. Geller seems to recognize this alternative use
in his subsequent work. See Geller, Patchwork, supra note 115, at 85 (pointing out use of
vague language in the WIPO treaties to permit divergent "patchwork" implementations).
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the open-ended language to favor local interests and to heavily infuse
implementation and enforcement decisions with domestic values.t 4 The
consequences for the exhaustion debate are substantial. As these national
"adjustments" cause substantial variations, the easy solution of hustling
the developing nations through the transitional phase so the international
market can get on with making appropriate economic utility exhaustion
determinations crumbles before a much more complicated calculus." 5
Appreciating just how far apart the parties remain can best be understood by exploring the normative conflicts smoothed over by the accord.
At the most obvious level, TRIPS expressly allows nations substantial
latitude regarding national public health concerns and encouragement of
"sectors vital to socioeconomic and technological development."'2 6 The
Report's reference to maximum price controls and compulsory licensing
2 17
concerning patented innovations with implications for public health
provides two specific examples of how countries may exercise this freedom. Both exceptions represent clear local judgments that other, nonefficiency interests (greater patient access to medicines) should prevail
over TRIPS-mandated IPR holder rights.
Although permitting such exceptions to reflect other competing
policy considerations may be appropriate, the effect is to eliminate economic utility as the exclusive basis for making exhaustion decisions. The
consequences of these "trumping" policies must, therefore, also be spe214. See Abbott, supra note 40, at 399; Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 17,
at 592. See also Geuze & Wager, supra note 182, at 349 (including a chart indicating that all
TRIPS complaints are from developed nations, most particularly the United States, and that
the defendants include mostly developing nations or those with non-U.S. IPR traditions).
215. It might be argued that the developing nations have already crossed this bridge by
agreeing to TRIPS. There are two answers. First, the open-ended language makes pinning
violators down with certainty problematic. Second, the international dispute resolution
mechanisms are insufficiently authoritative that ensuring compliance by true recalcitrants
pursuing their own best interests will likely involve a substantial degree of "self-help." At that
juncture, all parties largely abandon the pretext of agreement. See infra notes 274-76 and
accompanying text (discussing the need for cooperative solutions in international affairs).
216. Specifically, Article 8 provides for a wide variety of possible exceptions "necessary
to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1,
art. 8. It is unclear what the last clause requires, but, if it is to have any content, it must permit
some derogation of the TRIPS requirements. This interpretation is supported by Article 13,
which permits limitations to the copyrights provided they are limited to "special cases which
do not conflict with normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder." See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 13. Similar
or more extensive rights to impose limitations exist with respect to trademarks (art. 17), patents (arts. 27 and 30) and, generally, under article 40 with regard to adverse effects on trade.
217. See Report, supra note 9,at 635-36 (proposing an exception to the pro-exhaustion
rule in these instances).
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cifically considered when developing the international exhaustion position. For example, because a "forced" compulsory license or "limited"
price-controlled exercise of an IPR may adversely affect the holder's
incentive, perhaps those transactions should not be considered a triggering first sale for international exhaustion purposes. 2" On the other
hand, such a "no-first sale, non-exhaustion" position ignores the distributional consequences in other nations. Perhaps rather than forcing them
to bear the costs of providing supplemental IPR incentives, local interests would be better served by affording their citizens the same lower
price and/or greater availability benefits by applying a free-trade rule of
first sale exhaustion. 21 9
The most significant normative obstacle to international consensus
on IPR exhaustion, however, arises from the lack of agreement concerning the utility objectives themselves. These market-based
justifications compete in the international arena with a wide variety of
alternative views on intellectual property law. 220 An IP creator's investment can be seen as bestowing Lockean labor-based natural rights22' or
as an exercise of Hegelian personal liberty.2 That creative activity could
also be viewed as an interaction with, and confirmation of, a jointly
owned cultural heritage,2 3 the enhancement of national pride and community,2 the exercise of a usufruct right in a trust granted by ancestors
218. See id.
219. See Vicente, supra note 79, at 1118-19 (noting the subsidy effect of exhaustion on
developing markets without substantial competition). The result might be different in a common enterprise environment. See, e.g., Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb
Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 147, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 44 (1981). The Advocate
General argued no voluntary first sale of a recording under U.K. law which imposed a ceiling
on royalties. The E.C.J. found exhaustion based on the holder having voluntarily elected to
put the item on the intra-E.U. common market in the UK. See Musik-Vertrieb Membran, 1981
E.C.R. at 180, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. at 67.
220. See, e.g., David Hurlbut, Fixing the Biodiversity Convention: Toward a Special
Protocolfor Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 379, 382-88 (1994); Long,
supra note 5, at 148 n.68, 156-57; MERGES ET AL., supra note 177, at 2-21; Dale A. Nance,
Symposium on Law and Philosophy: Forward: Owning Ideas, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y
757, 761-67 (1990).
221. See John Locke, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 16-30 (Oskar Priest, ed., The
Liberal Arts Press 1952); Nance, supra note 221, at 764 (1990); Adam D. Moore, A Lockean
Theory of Intellectual Property,21 HAMLINE L. R. 65 (1997) (arguing that the incentive based
utilitarian theory of intellectual property rights should be abandoned in favor of a Lockean
paradigm).
222. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 235-36 (T. M.
Knox, trans., Oxford University Press 1942); Nance, supra note 221, at 764. See also Long,
supra note 5, at 157 (noting the Continental Western European adoption of this view in their
moral rights tradition).

223. See ALFORD, ELEGANT OFFENSE, supra note 96, at 25-29.
224. See Fung, supra note 202, at 620-24; Andrew J. McCall, Copyright and Trademark Enforcement in China, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 587, 589-92 (1996).
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or a contribution by

the individual to the common heritage of mankind. 226 Alternatively, the
creative act might even be interpreted as undesirable political dissention.227 Although there may be points of common ground across this wide
diversity of justifications, there are also many important differences.
These differences will affect the level of commitment to the TRIPS utility harmonization and, in turn, the national perspectives on exhaustion.
The lack of congruence between market-economic based IPRs and
"common culture" views of IP provides a notable example. As Professor
Alford has eloquently explained, the individual incentive focus of much
of Western intellectual property law conflicts in fundamental ways with
the Confucian view that ideas are part of a common heritage and should
be freely accessible to all civilized individuals.22 It is not that the Confucian worldview does not understand the motivations or benefits of U.S.
patent or copyright law; it simply does not accept or value them.229 It
may be that Chinese governmental reliance on Confucian arguments
disguises concerns that individual ownership (including through IPRs) is
a threat to the legitimacy of the existing political regime2 30 or acts as
cover for wholesale copying as an engine for economic growth.
Regardless of governmental motivations, however, if the cultural norm
among the "ordinary Chinese" conflicts with notions of individual ownership, the likelihood of a successful utility IPR model transplant is
exceedingly low. 232 The resulting restrictions will appear not only unjus-

225. See Hurlbut, supra note 220, at 385.

226. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 60-61; Alford, Making Safe, supra note 96, at 140; McCall, supra note 224, at 591.
227. See Alford, Making Safe, supra note 96, at 143-44.
228. See ALFORD,

ELEGANT OFFENSE,

supra note 96, at 8-29; Alford, Making Safe, su-

pra note 96, at 140. See also, Fung, supra note 202, at 623-24; Hamilton, supra note 205, at
619-20; McCall, supra note 224, at 590-92.
229. Cf Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights, & Sovereignty:
New Dilemmas in InternationalLaw Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and
the Conservation of Biodiversity, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 80 (1998) (noting that
the "Western epistemology" of predicating IPRs on notions of individual creation conflicts
with the basic communal orientation of these cultures).
230. See Alford, Making Safe, supra note 96, at 140-41.
231. That a distinction between "common heritage" and ulterior economic growth motivations actually exists is not entirely clear. The common heritage position includes the benefit
to the common good to be obtained by permitting developing economies to grow by using the
developed world's IP. See McCall, supra note 224, at 591. It is only from the utilityindividual rights perspective that this use might be seen as unfair "free-riding." See Tara
Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 327, 327-33 (1994); Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United
States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REv. 273,
282 (1991).
232. See Alford, Making Safe, supra note 96, at 142.
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tified, but contrary to the social good. It would not be surprising, therefore, to find Chinese government interpretations and enforcement
actions that eviscerate TRIPS Western-style minimum IPRs applauded
rather than reviled.233
Similar conflicts occur when national norms place unselfish contribution to overall social welfare above individual self-interest.234 Within
the former framework, all the necessary motivation for the creative act
comes from improvement of the common good. Individual economic
incentives are unnecessary to spur fully committed application of time
and expertise. Consequently, knowledge can be unfettered by intellectual
property exclusivity and remain freely available to all members of society.235 A legal realist must suspect that this position might also provide
an expedient rationalization for fueling domestic economic growth by
avoiding payment of rents to foreign IP creators.236 However, this accusation, while certainly appropriate in some instances, ignores two far
more crucial points. First, collectivism, even in this market-inefficient,
re-distributional formulation, still represents a legitimate alternative
view concerning the appropriateness of IPRs. 2 37 There is nothing obviously "wrong" in arguing that less economic wealth shared more "fairly"
is better than more economic wealth distributed "inequitably."238 Second,
adherence to a collectivist position, no matter why held or advocated,
233. Alford points out that, ironically, TRIPS may therefore actually permit government
repression of ideas through selective enforcement. Thus, the open-ended language of TRIPS
can allow the government to have it "both ways." See id. at 143-45.
234. See Coombe, supra note 229, at 80 (noting that many cultures view "innovations
... [as] products of the group... to meet practical shared needs"); Hurlbut, supra note 220, at
385-89 (stating that this view is consistent with Islamic and some African views as well);
Long, supra note 5, at 156-57 (discussing the views of the Maori in New Zealand).

235. See INTERNATIONAL

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,

supra note 5, at 60-61.

236. See Long, supra note 5, at 163; supra note 231. That same realist position would
also query how the alignments might alter if the definition of protectable IP were to change.
United States patent jurisprudence expressly articulates the common heritage view in connection with the unpatentability of laws of nature and abstract ideas. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (stating that such subject matter is "free
to all men and reserved exclusively to none"); Chiappetta, supra note 152, at 131-32
(discussing the laws of nature, abstract idea exception in United States patent law). It is not,
however, a forgone conclusion that those types of discoveries should not be protectable. See
Long, supra note 95 at 268-79 (discussing the possible expansion of IPRs to protect indigenous cultures). If, for example, a decision was made to incentivize investment in more rapid
discovery of natural medicines, it might well make a variety of folk remedies protectable. It is
highly likely in such a case that the current defenders of individual incentives would be heard
to raise the same "common heritage" arguments they currently disdain.
237. See Hurlbut, supra note 220, at 388.
238. All the words in quotes involve value judgments. The true collectivist will argue
that there should be no diminution of creative efforts and wealth if community interests properly motivate individuals. Perhaps more importantly, it can be argued that less economic
wealth traded for increases in respect for other values is a "desirable" exchange.

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 21:333

will have a significant effect on the exhaustion debate. If a society does
not find value in individual ownership of IP, whatever the reason, it is
unlikely to be generous in the interpretation or energetic in the enforcement of utility based IPRs. The related position on exhaustion will be
favored: the quicker unnecessary restraints on our "common heritage"
are removed, the better.
Japan, on the developed side of the economic divide, provides an
interesting example of the difficulty in reconciling these conflicting
utility-based individual incentives and more collectivist conceptions of
the human enterprise. More than other Asian nations, Japan has followed
the developed country IPR model, with largely comparable laws on its
books.2 3 9 The Japanese have, however, historically valued community,
craftsmanship, incremental improvement and adaptation over the
individualism and revolutionary innovation which forms the centerpiece
of United States and European incentive focused intellectual property
laws. m The result is a hybrid interpretation of Japanese IPRs,
incorporating elements of both the utility model incentives and
communitarian views. 24' For example, Japanese patent law respects the
inventiveness of improvements by lowering the threshold for obtaining
protection but seeks to foster additional application by narrowly
interpreting the scope of the resulting rights.42 Consequently, Japan's
"mixed" focus may permit more ready philosophical acceptance of
international exhaustion and its tempering of economic market
incentives despite its developed country intellectual property legal
structure.2'3
239. Although there are differences, the "Western" complaints about Japanese intellec-

tual property law are largely related to "protectionist" implementation. See INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 409-13. As discussed below in the text,
these complaints go, in part at least, to differences in the values applied when drawing the
individual versus social balance.
240. See Toshiko Takenaka, Does a CulturalBarrierto Intellectual Property Trade Exist? The Japanese Example, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 153, 157, 164, 167. Takenaka

argues that these views are more economic than cultural (providing a means to catch up with
developed economies). See id. at 167. However, his reference to different values indicates that
whatever the origins, the views have become a part of at least the commercial culture in Ja-

pan, dictating a different approach to IPRs. See id. at 175.
241. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 413
(including the following interesting quote from Akira Okawa, former chief examiner in the
Japanese patent office: "in Japan, we have a balance between the rights of patent holders and
society. In the U.S., they don't care about society.").

242. See id. at 409-13; Takenaka, supra note 240, at 168 (noting criticism of Japan for
narrow reading of patent claims).
243. It is good to remain somewhat circumspect, however, and remember that distributional consequences may affect the definition of the relevant "community." A failure to note
this disconnect between "good of society" rhetoric and the practical distributional effects may
explain, in part, the Japanese Supreme Court's decision in favor of international exhaustion
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The normative differences are not, however, limited to Eastern
common heritage and collectivism versus Western individual incentive
viewpoints; the world is a much more complicated place than that. Important divisions are equally visible among the members of the Western
world.2" The best example"4 is found in the continuing disagreement
over moral rights in copyright law. ' Moral rights, including the rights
of publication (divulgation), attribution (paternity), integrity and withdrawal, 27 are predicated on natural or Hegelian rights of the author as
creator of the work.' " These systems, associated most strongly with
France but present in a variety of other jurisdictions as well,249 provide
extensive post-sale involvement of the author in decisions concerning
distribution and use of the work.2 50 As a consequence, exhaustion analysis under the moral rights approach differs dramatically from the utility
"incentive to invent" justification supporting U.S. copyright law.25' The
despite the harm to the domestic IP industry. See Tessensohn & Yamamoto, supra note 72, at
746-47 (noting the Supreme Court's inexplicable enthusiasm for a "truly global economy").
244. See, e.g., Long, supra note 5, at 137-47, 155 (noting in particular the North-North
debate).
245. This is only one example among many. The different positions regarding whether
plants and animals are proper subject matter stem from philosophical differences over the
-propriety of genetic engineering and the patenting of "living things." These disagreements
were sufficiently intractable that TRIPS ultimately left the matter to national discretion. See
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 27(3). Other "North-North" disagreements needing
resolution include: the patentability and copyright protection of computer programs
(apparently, they are protected), see TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 10, 27; first-to-file
versus first-to-invent and degree of novelty in patent law; reverse engineering, originality in
copyright law and use in trademark law. Cf. Long, supra note 5, 137-47. Even within the
E.U., substantial work (including arm-twisting) has been required to resolve differences
among the Member States. See, e.g., Loewenheim, supra note 179, at 484-87; Verstrynge,
supra note 76, at 17.
246. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 127; Long,
supra note 5, at 157-58. As Professor Long points out, the philosophical differences are so
strong they even extend to disagreement over the appropriate labels for the author's rights.
See Long, supra note 5, at 148.

247. See

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,

supra note 5, at 137-38;

Long, supra note 5, at 148.
248. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 130-33; Jane
C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and
America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991,991-92 (1990); Long, supra note 5, at 157.

249. See

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,

supra note 5, at 137-38

(noting that moral rights also appear in a variety of civil law jurisdictions in Latin American,
Africa and East Asia).
250. All rights place obligations on subsequent purchasers. The rights of disclosure and
withdrawal may permit the author to prohibit or affect sales. See id., supra note 5, at 138-39.
Additional "natural law/personhood" based rights, such as the French droit de suite, impose
even more significant barriers to free-flow of goods. Cf. id., supra note 5, at 173-76.
251. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 132; Cate,
supra note 5, at 5-6; Ginsburg, supra note 248, at 991-94 (arguing, however, that in practice
the regimes may not diverge as dramatically as one would expect). The United States provides
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latter, viewing the author's creation as an economic product, can readily

accommodate first sale exhaustion based on a demonstration that additional incentive is not required. 2 The former, which grants the author a
right to protect the self-expression and personal identity manifested in
the creation, provides little justification for curtailing or eliminating this
control, even after a first sale.
The division on moral rights does not stop, however, with the sharp
divide between utility and author's rights. The European moral rights
advocates themselves disagree. France takes the dualist view that moral
2 3
rights are entirely separate from the economic "exploitative" rights.
Germany, however, is monist, treating moral rights simply as part of the
economic bundle.2m As a consequence, moral rights may be extinguished

as part of an assignment in Germany, but survive (to the horror of the
uninitiated purchaser) in France. 55 Once again, the differing positions
offer varying degrees of flexibility on the exhaustion question.
Adding the debates over "authorship" to the mix,2 6 it is apparent that
these Western disagreements are not minor variations on a single theme,
but reflect fundamentally different views of the objectives of the widevariety of rights granted under the "copyright" rubric. Although France,
only minimal recognition of moral rights, despite its accession to Berne, which expressly
recognizes moral rights. See Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 6bis; Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
(1994)). The United States' limited acknowledgement of moral rights can be found in the
Visual Rights Act of 1990. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994). See also Cate, supra note 5, at 5-6;
MERGES ET AL, supra note 177, at 451-56. The United States has no droit de suite. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 163-68. Ironically, in patent
law, the United States' all but unique "first to invent" rule finds justification not merely in a
Jeffersonian preference for the "little person" who may not have the necessary resources to
outrace the commercial titan, but in the natural right to ownership of the "true inventor." See
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 401-04. See also Geller,
Patchwork, supra note 115, at 85 (noting that the differences between European and U.S.
views on copyright go well beyond the moral rights debate).
252. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 133-35. Under a utility approach, it can even be argued that no rights of any kind are appropriate. See
Breyer, supra note 157, at 299.
253. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 141-44.
254. See id.
255. See id. The E.C.J. faced the monist/dualist moral rights division in Musik-Vertrieb
Membran GmbH v. GEMA, Joined Cases 55/80 and 57/80, 1981 E.C.R. 147, [1981] 2
C.M.L.R. 44 (1981). The French asserted that intra-E.U. exhaustion should not apply because
of the implicated, and distinct, moral rights. The court rejected the argument, noting the actual
issue involved only economic rights to royalties that were exhausted under the intra-E.U.
common market primacy principle. The decision does not resolve whether the non-economic
moral rights remained intact. See John E. Somorjai, The Evolution of a Common Market:
Limits Imposed on the Protection of National Intellectual Property Rights in the European
Economic Community, 9 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 431.
256. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 5, at 12333; Aoki, supra note 209, at 1322-28.
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Germany and the United States may see eye-to-eye on the utility justifications for the economic sticks in the author's bundle of rights, each
party's other eye is looking in an entirely separate direction. These value
differences were strongly enough held that the issue, like exhaustion,
was expressly left unresolved in TRIPS.72
IV. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? A TwO-PART
PROPOSAL FOR MOVING FORWARD

Economic power may have been sufficient to force the utility IPR
transplant. However, conflicts over distributional considerations and
substantial philosophical differences leave it an open issue as to whether
the transplant will "take." TRIPS may mute alternative views, but its
open-ended language leaves them far from silenced.2 " The underlying
disagreements will profoundly affect national interpretation and enforcement of the accord.2 9 Not only will these national perspectives and
interests lead to divergent views on exhaustion directly, but the related
"tinkering" with the rights or their enforcement will affect the "apples to
apples" considerations even among those that appear to agree.'
Vigorous policing of "recalcitrant" implementations through increased economic (or other) coercion likely will strain the already
"open-ended" TRIPS accord to the breaking point. Rather than generating further acquiescence, such action is far more likely to give rise to
increased resistance to this "polite form of imperialism." 26' A successful
approach to international exhaustion must instead step back and expressly acknowledge the disagreements, seeking an understanding that
takes into account all relevant considerations. With these requirements in
mind, the following proposal is offered addressing the procedural and
substantive aspects of the undertaking.

257. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (expressly excluding the moral rights
protected under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention).
258. See Reichman, Bargaining Around, supra note 21, at 18-24.
259. See id. at 15; Abbott, supra note 40, at 399; Hamilton, supra note 205, at 615-17;
sources cited supra note 214.
260. See Fitzgerald, supra note 203, at 159 (indicating that "ubiquity" may mitigate the
problem in some instances); Long, supra note 5, at 158-59 (noting the effect of cultural differences on the enforcement of facially consistent laws).
261. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing the Ladas "imperialism"
point); Reichman, Enforcing, supra note 5, at 339-40; Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 17, at 592; Vicente, supra note 79, at 1108 (noting that Argentina's reaction to
continued U.S. pressure was to threaten to extend transitional implementation of TRIPS).
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A. An OperationalApproach-ProcessConsiderations
International commerce will not stand still while governments thrash
out the details of a mutually acceptable resolution. Failure to reach a
consensus is, therefore, a decision. As trade continues, national autonomy on IPR exhaustion will be exercised. Procedural refinements to this
de facto operational non-agreement are critical if informed and useful
ongoing discussion is to occur in the context of the resulting patchwork
of rules. These refinements should expressly target ensuring transparency and internal logical consistency in national and regional decisionmaking.262 Disclosing and articulating the applicable justifications and
the rationales for outcomes will expose the differences driving conflicting outcomes, thus permitting the larger discussion to take them into
account properly. Three specific process improvements accomplish this
task:
Justifications, not labels: To ensure analytical coherence and consistency, decision-making must avoid "open-ended" labels and focus
directly on justifications. Only truly "like rights," those emanating from
similar justifications, should be treated as parallel rights for exhaustion
purposes.263 The IPR classification schema must therefore be sufficiently
fine-grained to make the necessary distinctions. In short, for these purposes, a copyright is not a copyright is not a copyright.'(' A "copyright"
based on economic incentive to creation cannot also find support in the
creator's Lockean natural right to a return from his efforts or Hegelian
moral rights to personal integrity. Jumbling these three justifications into
one "copyright" label leads to unavoidable and serious analytical confusion. The incentive approach dictates exhaustion at the point when the
proper balance between incentive and access is achieved. Natural labor
rights must find the extent of a "fair" return. Moral right to integrity argues strongly against any exhaustion even in the face of excess
incentives or returns. The classification schema must therefore generate
a distinct right for each justification: separate economic, labor, and personhood-based "copyrights. 265
"Full range" consideration: Every effort must be made to ensure all
applicable policy justifications, foreign and domestic, for protecting and
not protecting the IP at issue, are expressly considered by the decisionmaker. This process requirement includes those revealed by the IPR
classification schema (for example, economic, labor and personhood
262. The approach applies to all forms of decision-making: legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial.
263. See supra notes 173-77 (discussing the "apples to apples" comparison issue).
264. My apologies to Gertrude Stein.
265. This is similar to the French dualist view discussed supra notes 253-55.
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copyright justifications) as well as those specific to the particular product and market context, such as policies favoring public health access
and protection of cultural heritage, public safety or morals.
Transparent assessment: Finally, the decision must clearly reflect
the actual policy basis for the exhaustion outcome. 26 The national or
regional decision-maker remains free to accept or reject "foreign" justifications, IPR or otherwise, for protection. Transparency, however,
requires it do so directly, expressly stating which justifications have
been accepted, which have been rejected and why. 67
These process changes do not seek outcome uniformity; they seek to
ensure that policy discussions can identify the actual points of agreement, disagreement and, perhaps most importantly, disconnect (where
the parties are not even aware of their respective differing justifications).
For example, consider the decisionmaker addressing exhaustion of
'"copyright" in a painting. Although the decision-maker retains complete
freedom concerning result, the decision-making process should follow
the above requirements. The decisionmaker should ignore the copyright
label and identify and address the full range of justifications for protection: economic, labor, natural and none (common heritage). The decision
itself must clearly state the rationale for the outcome. For example, it
might justify an exhaustion outcome by stating that, because national
norms recognize only economic incentive justifications, other views,
including moral, labor and common heritage views have been rejected
and that, under prevailing local market conditions, distributional considerations dictate favoring domestic consumers over increased creator
incentives (domestic and foreign). By following these procedures, in
future discussions, whether other nations agree or disagree on the merits,
there will be little confusion over issues of classification, justification, or
reasons for favoring common market over IPR primacy.
B. Reaching Substantive Resolution
The search for appropriate international agreement on IPR exhaustion
should be driven by both procedural and substantive considerations. The
procedural requirements are, not surprisingly, the same as those that ensure
clarity in national and regional decision-making. The international
266. Transparency is a doctrine of substantial international standing, specifically reflected in TRIPS. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 63; Reichman, Bargaining
Around, supra note 21, at 13 (noting the carry-over from GATT).
267. As a result, when national IPRs are created, the body in charge will need to be clear
concerning the justifications. In addition to assisting in resolving the exhaustion issue, this
process will have the additional benefit of forcing greater focus on what justifies the taking
from the commons.
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debate must avoid labels and focus on justifications, include full-range
consideration of justifications and maximize transparency concerning
the supporting rationales for the particular outcomes being advanced.
Dealing with the substantive issues, however, also requires a change
in paradigm. The prevailing economic approach to resolving the exhaustion debate poses the issue fundamentally as a comparison between
global market returns from common market and IPR primacy. If the nod
goes to the former, the answer lies in pressing forward with WTO freetrade objectives.2 6' Recalcitrants must be cajoled into "thinking right"
and joining the effort to remove barriers to free-flowing "internal trade"
as defined by a worldwide common market. In contrast, IPR primacy
places the emphasis on maximizing overall wealth creation through
proper application of incentives to creation, avoiding consumer confusion and encouraging sharing of controlled information. The key
assumption of this global economic approach is that individual decisionmakers will forgo self-interest-enhancing positions to pursue net
maximization of wealth. This requires the parties to believe adequate
assurances exist that individual distributional "inequities" will be satisfactorily resolved. This means that, at least, they will be better off with
their share of the greater, cooperatively generated wealth than by grabbing what they can of what exists without collaboration.
Common enterprise provides a potential solution. 69 Perhaps the
same inexorable forces of global commerce which have driven the WTO
and TRIPS will eventually force the world community to recognize there
really is only a single, common global marketplace.270 If so, it must also
only be a matter of time before we understand that these same forces of
"globalization" bind us together in a common enterprise. Consequently,
it is ultimately in everyone's best interests to put in place decisionmaking structures which address the distributional consequences of joint
action, permitting the group to focus on making the shared pie as big as
possible.27'
The problem with this vision goes beyond the fact that its arrival is
at best only vaguely presaged, with nothing concrete visible, even on the
268. See Abbott, supra note 21, at 511 (identifying free trade as the overarching WTO
goal, with supplemental attention to needs of developing countries); Report, supra note 9, at
635 (coming out in favor of exhaustion and free-trade).
269. See supra notes 79-105 (discussing the effect of common enterprise on national
and regional exhaustion positions).
270. See FRiEDMAN, supra note 98, at 7-22 (1999) (noting, however, that the interconnectedness is more than economic).
271. Fundamentally, the point is that the WTO membership will eventually get around
to implementing an "E.U.-like" model. Cf Report, supra note 9, at 617-18 (noting that this
has not yet occurred).
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distant horizon. The real difficulty lies in its simplistic vision of the
world as merely a global economic system. The participants' conflicting
views rest on more than generation and distribution of goods and services. They reflect differences concerning the legitimacy of the economic
decision-making paradigm itself. Competing views of how we should
view the human enterprise, such as natural rights, personhoodindividual integrity and communitarian beliefs define wealth (or more
precisely "value") in fundamentally different ways. On resolving these
disagreements, economic theory holds no greater normative claim than
any other approach .272 Important as it may be to understanding one set of
consequences (specifically what and how much is produced), market
driven economic
wealth maximization is only one value consideration
3
among many.2
Selecting among contradictory norms frequently turns, as a practical
matter, on the decision-making mechanism itself.27 4 Because the basic
international decision-making process requires unanimity,"' absent unassailable empirical evidence (or divine intervention), it is extremely
unlikely that a particular position is going to prevail in the short-term.
Even if economic (or other) power permits such ascendancy through the
forced transplanting of the related legal regime (as in TRIPS), without
the underlying normative consensus, it is likely to be at best a strikingly
incomplete victory. 76
272. Economic methodology could be applied to determine how strongly these other
views are "valued" based on willingness to pay and, in turn, how much of each should be
produced to maximize wealth. However, this approach still requires agreement that economic
willingness to pay is determinative. Otherwise, economic valuation is entirely unresponsive to
the "ultimate value" argument that a consumer's (or groups'), perhaps misguided, willingness
to pay is not the correct basis for making determinations of "ought." See POSNER, supra note
187, at 12-17 (discussing value/willingness to pay, utility and efficiency, including the difficulties of using them in social decisionmaking). Judge Posner notes that even if the parties
agree, there are still a number of problems in application.
273. See id. at 13. There is real value in focusing on the market economic rationales for
intellectual property laws and the consequences of abandoning them. That value, however, is
limited to more fully understanding the costs of abandoning those objectives in order to obtain
other benefits. See Chiappetta, supra note 151, at 93 n.154.
274. Agreeing how to decide is critical to any decision-making process. Without accord
on another process (majority rule, consensus with veto, delegated decision, or fiat through
power), agreement is a matter of individual consent. Cf. Aoki, supra note 209, at 1341-45
(discussing the difficulties of selecting an international baseline from among national norms
set by, at least traditionally, sovereign states and the related threat to autonomous decisionmaking).
275. A large number of international decision-making processes concerning a wide variety of issues do exist. These have all been put in place, however, through the basic unanimity
convention predicated on national sovereignty. The use of coercion, particularly through
military force, appears to have some currency, but even its use is frequently based on some
voluntary accord, such as a United Nations resolution directed at a member-state.
276. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
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More importantly, faced as we are with conflicting "truths," all
should be wary of power as the vehicle for agreement. Power can prove
a fickle vassal and those currently in possession should perhaps plan for
the worst.277 Although enlightened self-interest is relevant, the concern
goes substantially further. Much has been written concerning the cultural
imperialism of the Northern, Western, and/or developed nations in the
intellectual property context. 28 The important message, however, does
not concern the clear illegitimacy of the values being forcibly transplanted by those in power or the undeniable merits of the alternative
views held by those who are not. The real point is that in our present
state of grace, a healthy dose of circumspection is appropriate concerning anyone's ability to pick the "right" or even the "best" approach from
among the myriad choices. It is entirely possible, even likely, that the
wielders of power may discover their choice which held such apparent
promise turns out to be "wrong," even for them, in the long run. Unless
we are certain of the real rules of the game, there is much to be said for
hedging our bets.
The current paradigm that drives relentlessly toward convergence,
S •
279
finding the single correct "yes or no" answer, should be jettisoned.
Grabbing the other end of the stick reveals that the answer lies in affirmatively agreeing to disagree; recognizing that the TRIPS outcome is
not a failed negotiation but a desirable international operating relationship. Given the diversity of economic and normative positions, the most
appropriate position is to respect those differences, 2m leaving each national (or regional) market's approach to international exhaustion as a
matter for domestic determination based expressly on maximized selfinterest, however that may be locally defined.
277. This argument in favor of diversity over economic utility is consistent with, but
does not rely on the social justice arguments made by John Rawls. Rawls defines a social

contract based on equality and fairness. See John Rawls, A
(recently revised and republished as A THEORY OF JUSTICE,

THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971)
REVISED EDITION 1999). Eco-

nomic theorists have attacked that position as being without operational content. See

POSNER,

supra note 187, at 506. The argument here only requires the individual actor (nation in this
case) focus on its own best interests.
278. See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 209, at 1296-97; Coombe, supra note 17, at 238; Hamilton, supra note 205, at 616; Long, Cultures, supra note 95, at 246-48.
279. Cf. Aoki, supra note 209, at 1344, 1352-53 ("hopes for a 'unified field theory' of
intellectual property" are inappropriate).
280. Cf. Aoki, supra note 209, at 1342-44; Long, Cultures, supra note 95, at 249
(arguing a need for flexibility to protect and nurture indigenous cultures); Reichman, Securing
Compliance, supra note 17, at 596 (arguing that WTO jurisprudence rests on deference to
local law and strict construction of treaties).
281. This is the same position taken under both NAFTA and MERCOSUR, trading
blocks formed without the strong sense of common enterprise necessary to convince parties to
forgo looking out directly for their own interests. See supra notes 106-13.
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Respect and autonomy do not, however, mandate disagreement.
When interests and values align, agreement is fully justified and desirable. 2 The agreement to disagree only imposes two conditions. First, the
normative consensus permitting agreement must be predicated on the
participants' actual circumstances and beliefs, not the result of a
"transplant" forced by those holding power. Second, the agreement's
articulation must be expressly and specifically limited to the reach of the
supporting normative consensus. Within these limitations, the new paradigm actually increases the possibility of true, albeit limited, accords on
exhaustion. The process improvements will enhance the ability to identify overlapping national IPR justifications. 283 They will also clarify the
specific nature of remaining disagreements making negotiations concerning voluntary compromise more effective.
Within this framework, a number of agreements are possible and
even desirable concerning the TRIPS mandated IPRs. To the extent
parties (few, many, or all) agree on utility objectives, it is entirely
appropriate for them to maximize those goals. The result may be a
mutual adoption of the free-trade proposal in the Report, adjusted to
reflect the different exhaustion results appropriate to the differing patent,
copyright, trademark, and trade secret applications of the market-utility
model. In reaching this agreement, however, the parties will clearly
understand that IPRs based on other justifications, such as moral rights,
remain open to separate national self-interested treatment. Additionally,
any party remains free to withhold agreement whether based on different
views of the appropriate justifications, distributional considerations or
otherwise.M Such dissention, however, should follow the procedural
requirements, particularly transparency, so the differences can be
specifically identified and addressed without an overlaid fog of totally
irrelevant rhetoric. Finally, nothing prohibits a nation from compromising with others, in effect using IPR isolation or opening of its
domestic market as a bilateral negotiating chit to obtain advantageous
quidpro quo distributional or other concessions.
Moreover, the "agreement not to agree" framework provides a
dynamic approach responsive to changing conditions. As local
economic, social and political conditions change, additional agreements

282. Cf. Geller, Patchwork, supra note 115, at 89 (noting the possibility of identifying
common principles as a means for reaching actual consensus).
283. See Long, supra note 5, at 162 (noting the importance of mutual comprehension in
reaching accords).
284. The analysis set out in the text would apply generally if TRIPS represents a fixed
"deal." However, for the reasons noted, there is good reason not to insist too vigorously on

adherence to its terms.
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can develop (and disappear) reflecting the parties' evolving positions. 25
Should regional (or even global) shared common economic enterprises
emerge over time, this approach readily accommodates any resulting
agreement on the appropriate "internal" rule on exhaustion.
Implementation of these procedural and substantive changes can
benefit from a number of related supporting understandings. Because the
new approach requires substantial latitude in the expression of disagreement, the international community should avoid insisting too
vehemently on specific interpretations of the purportedly harmonized
TRIPS IPRs.286 To do so forces disingenuity and subterfuge, risking precisely the confusion that must be avoided. Because the weak level of
consensus makes it unlikely that much by way of efficient harmonization
will be accomplished in any event, the loss from liberalizing implementation should not be great.2 7 Additionally, it may prove useful for
national and regional decision-makers to adopt a default pro-exhaustion
presumption for cases that are indeterminate within their own policy
framework. 8' Whenever local interests and beliefs do not specifically
dictate a contrary outcome, the Report's analysis provides a convincing
argument that the competition disciplines of free trade are most likely to
provide maximum benefit.2 89 Therefore, it is best left to the affected individual IPR holder to make the contrary case. 290 Finally, national
285. Perhaps the clearest intellectual property example is the change in the U.S. position
on intellectual property law as it evolved from a net consumer to a net creator. See supra note
96. See also Reichman, Securing Compliance, supra note 17, at 600-01; Jerome H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement: Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 370 (1996) (noting Ladas' consensual evolutionary theory of justifications for IPRs).
286. See Reichman, BargainingAround, supra note 21, at 15-16 (arguing for a more
cooperative approach to implementation); Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in InternationalTrade: Opportunitiesand Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 747 (1989) (arguing pre-TRIPS for flexibility toward developing countries); Reichman,
Securing Compliance, supra note 17 (arguing for permitting flexibility in interpretation of
TRIPS obligations).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 194-215 (discussing the lack of consensus),
258-60 (discussing the likelihood of imperfect implementation as a result).
288. This is similar to the rule of reason approach suggested by Donnelly and is offered
here for much the same reasons he suggests. See Donnelly, supra note 63, at 499-502, 510.
Donnelly, however, proposes the approach as a general rule, not merely the default rule when
a nation is indifferent. The argument that general application takes too much power away
from the individual decision-makers to protect their own interests is made above in the text.
289. See Report, supra note 9, at 607.
290. A non-exhaustion default not only offers less likelihood of benefit but also places
the burden of overcoming the presumption with a group unlikely to mount the necessary effort. Specifically, the mechanics of bringing pressure to bear concerning non-competitive
consumer prices on specific goods are daunting at best. Only the most egregious cases are
likely to arouse sufficient interest. However, those cases are precisely those most likely not to
require the default rule, there being sufficient attention for a national position to have already
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authorities should scrutinize attempts at private adjustment of public exhaustion rules through contract not only under domestic competition law
principles, but also for consistency with the objectives driving the local

position on exhaustion.29" '
An agreement to disagree is not without cost. There will be public
and private administrative costs related to establishing and determining
national rules and private costs incurred to develop strategies for dealing
with them.29 There will be dislocations in availability of goods and
services as trading interests make their decisions against the backdrop of
diverse national and regional rules.2" There will be decreased economic
efficiency in global trade and, consequently, reduced overall production
of goods and services.294

We should not proceed predicated on the hope that rapid convergence will mitigate these effects. 29 The divisions are deep, and any
reconciliation will take time. More importantly, because the disagreements do not merely require the "wrong thinkers" to eventually come

around to the truth, convergence may ultimately be impossible. 2" Consequently, the costs of diversity cannot be ignored as merely
insignificant, short-term effects. Actual justifications must support taking this course on international exhaustion.
Two such justifications exist. First, any uniform rule will have adverse distributional consequences on some group, meaning there must be
developed. In contrast, parallel IPR holders in smaller niche markets who stand to benefit
directly will be more likely to make their specific case against the default.
291. Because parties may attempt to avoid such a policy review through non-sale articulations (for example, licensing in the software or movie context), decision-makers must
look behind the form of a transaction to its substance. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MIcH. L. REV. 462,
482 n.70 (1998) (noting the use of licensing terminology to evade the first sale doctrine and
the courts' application of a functional test). For example, perhaps a perpetual license should
be treated as a sale. In contrast, a rental of software or videocassette for one-time, limited use
or viewing lacks the "sale" attribute of continuous possession by the acquirer and should be
treated differently.
292. See Chisum, supra note 115, at 617-18 (pointing out the administrative and possible free-riding costs).
293. Regardless of which position a nation takes on the exhaustion issue, the arguments
made for the contrary position will apply to some extent, generating costs. In some cases, the
inability to erect barriers may cause markets to be under-supplied for fear of free riding; in
others, IPR barriers may result in inadequate competition to provide efficient pricing results.
294. Allowing local interests to prevail over global interests means global wealth maximizing strategies will be forgone when national decision-makers view the distributional
consequences as unacceptable. Cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 83-92 (noting those costs
may be disproportionately borne by those countries electing out of the global free-trade economy).
295. See supra notes 194-257 and accompanying text.
296. See RAWLS, supra note 277, at 45-63(arguing that differences in ultimate values
are inevitable).
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"winners and losers." This should affect every party's enthusiasm. As
discussed above, when dealing with changing economic, social and political conditions, there is no assurance of constant "winner" status over
the long-term. Additionally, because complex interactions make identifying "us" and "them" a difficult exercise, even short-term advantage is
uncertain.2 97 IPR issues do not pit clearly defined consistent interest
groups against one another. Disagreements include the United States'
(and others) opposition to China (and others) over common heritage, the
Continental European (and others) opposition to the United States (and
others) on moral rights and certain factions in the United States in opposition to other factions in the United States over the necessity or value of
copyright incentives at all. Therefore, as the comprehensive uniform rule
is developed, "self interest" alignments will change with some of "us"
becoming "them" and some of "them" becoming "us." Consequently,
every participant will ultimately find itself on both the winning and losing side of the diversity question. 98 Without common enterprise accord
to handle potentially adverse distributional consequences, the best position is to preserve autonomy of action under an agreement to disagree.2
Second, it is vital to recognize that uniformity, of any kind, comes
with its own costs. Specifically, the WTO objective of creating a maximally efficient, common trading market (whether through exhaustion or
non-exhaustion), 3N although perhaps the best system for maximizing the
production of goods and services,3"' may be in need of some thoughtful
tempering. As the E.U. has discovered, establishing a "common market"
inevitably brings with it some degree of homogenization. The necessary
enabling agreements, such as when something can be called "beer"30 2 or
297. See id.
298. For example, it is not improbable that, although the United States might "win" by

obtaining agreement on a rule of non-exhaustion of economic rights, it may come at the expense of having to recognize "inefficient" non-economic moral rights as part of the package.

The United States might also find itself on the "consumer" end of a variety of important protected forms of IP, such as indigenous peoples' folkloric arts and sciences.

299. It might be argued that the decision to forgo a uniform rule itself comes at the sin-

gular expense of developing economies without adequate baseline availability of goods and

services. That, however, is a distributional complaint, which requires accord on a key underlying point of contention. Until accord on this issue is reached, the effects are best mitigated
by ensuring each country retains control over its national economy, permitting it to maximize
its self-interests (either pursuing price competition by permitting parallel imports or gaining
advantage for domestic IP industry, encouraging in-bound technology transfer and manufac-

turing or gaining bilateral concessions through non-exhaustion segmentation).
300. Cf Report, supra note 9, at 611-12 (noting that the goal of the WTO is free trade).
301. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 85-86.
302. Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780
(1987) (holding that Germany cannot limit the use of the word "Bier" to beverages manufactured in accordance with German standards).
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a fruit liqueur, 3°3 requires eliminating differences. Similarly, reaching a
single international position on IPR exhaustion requires elimination of
all conflicting national views and the differing values and the interests
that drive them.
The Report suggests that reaching the proper result on exhaustion
34
depends on whether "local" or "global" interests are given preference.
This articulation, true to the Report's global economic analytic
framework, implies a fundamental trade-off exists between local and
global community interests. However, once market economic measures
are abandoned as the exclusive measure of success, it becomes apparent
that continued local diversity may actually make us globally "better off."
Giving up individuality (personal and national) is serious business, 5
making it important to consider whether the costs in lost variety
outweigh the benefits of maximally efficient operation of the
marketplace.3 If there is more to the human enterprise than getting our
way (right or wrong) or letting power dictate that the short-term interests
of the few will prevail over the long-term interests of us all, the
economic costs of preserving, diversity may be a small price to pay to
avoid the arbitrary homogenization of values that choosing (or forcing) a
single approach inevitably entails. 37 From this perspective, inefficiency
"costs" can be better viewed for what they really are: investments in
diversity for everyone's benefit. Without certainty as to the "right"

303. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltug fur Branntwein, 1979
E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979) (holding that Germany cannot prohibit import of
liqueur legally manufactured in France because it fails to meet minimum alcohol content under German law).
304. Report, supra note 9, at 624.
305. This was a major reason Norway declined to join the E.U. See Friedman, supra
note 98, at 30.
306. See Bradley, supra note 57, at 584 n.390 (noting, without elaborating, that there
may be normative reasons for maintaining cultural differences); Coombe, supra note 17, at
240 (arguing that enforcement of IPRs risks reinforces "tendencies toward American cultural
hegemony); Long, Cultures, supra note 95, at 240-47. Cf.Kenneth D. Crews, Harmonization
and the Goals of Copyright: Property Rights or Cultural Progress,6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 117 (1998) (noting the effects of harmonization even on U.S. copyright policy).
307. Again, the position is consistent with Rawls, particularly concerning the undesirability of oppression. See RAWLS, supra note 277 at 195-258. However, the argument is not
that this respect for diversity is just or fair, but that it is supported by self-interest in an environment of uncertainty. Additionally, leaving philosophy aside, experience provides strong
support for the position that life is a lot more interesting with variety. Perhaps, therefore, we
should be willing to trade our ability to get the second SUV made scarce by economic inefficiency for conversations with people who strongly hold communitarian or natural rights
views. Cf.Coombe, supra note 17, at 241. Diversity does get problematic, however, when a
particular worldview demands eradication of disbeliveers. That argues, however, for limitations, not the very homogeneity such views would seek.
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answer, the.most important "good and service" any system can deliver is
preserving our ability to learn from our differences.
The IPR experience offers valuable insights and guidance concerning the current vigorous WTO agenda debates. Whether the issue is
international exhaustion, the environment, labor standards or another
principle key to a particular constituency's definition of the one true
path,3 °s we would do well to recall that uniformity comes with costs.
Therefore, to really be "in this together," we must not only resolve the
distributional consequences,3°9 but also recognize that we are not all the
same and that may be a good thing.

308. See supra note 27 (discussing the efforts to expand the WTO agenda and related
concerns).
309. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 98, at 225-28 (noting that the "owners" of the rainforests are unlikely to willingly forgo exploitation of their one source of wealth simply so the
rest of us can benefit from a better environment.); supra notes 14, 27 (citing articles noting the
distributional effects of the labor and environmental requirements).

